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THE SHORT LIFE AND RESURRECTION OF
SEC RULE 19C-4
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE*
Shares of common stock represent a bundle of ownership interests: a
set of economic fights, such as the right to receive dividends declared by
the board of directors; and the right to vote on certain corporate deci-
sions, with one vote per share of common stock being the U.S. norm for
over a century. The voting rights part of the bundle typically does not
matter very much. Shareholders are entitled to vote on only a small set
of corporate actions; the board of directors makes most decisions or dele-
gates them to officers and employees.
Voting rights do matter in one critical context-contests for corporate
control.I If incumbent managers are (or are believed to be) inefficient or
self-interested, the value of the corporation's stock should begin to fall.
This makes it possible for others to reap capital gains by ousting the
incumbents and replacing them with more diligent or trustworthy man-
agers. These gains, however, can be realized only if the challenger con-
trols enough shares to outvote the incumbents.2
During the last two decades, many corporate managers who saw them-
selves as competent and loyal nevertheless saw their firms subjected to
hostile takeover bids.' Unsurprisingly, many resisted. While the prevail-
ing fashions in defensive tactics change constantly, voting control re-
* Assistant Professor, University of Illinois College of Law. J.D., University of Virginia,
1985; M.S., University of Virginia, 1983; B.A., Western Maryland College, 1980.
While in private practice, I assisted a private lobbying effort before the Securities and Exchange
Commission in connection with the rulemaking proceedings leading up to the adoption of rule 19c-4.
The opinions expressed herein, however, are solely my own. For helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article, I wish to thank William J. Davey, Michael P. Dooley, Thomas M. Mengler, Robert
D. Rosenbaum, and Stephen F. Ross. I also wish to thank Stephanie Barrick for her excellent
research assistance.
1. See generally Manne, Some Theoretical Aspects of Share Voting: An Essay in Honor ofAdolf
A. Berle, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427 (1964).
2. Id. at 1430-34.
3. While not unmixed, some empirical evidence supports the proposition that well-managed
firms, as well as inefficient ones, are subjected to hostile takeover bids. For an exhaustive overview of
the empirical and theoretical literature on the motivation for corporate acquisitions, see R. GILSON,
THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 255-500 (1986). More recent develop-
ments in this area are summarized in R. GILSON, SUPPLEMENT TO THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQuIsITIONs 2-120 (Supp. 1990).
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mains the surest takeover defense. An incumbent who cannot be
outvoted, after all, cannot be ousted. In the early 1980s, a growing
number of companies therefore adopted dual class capital structures
(also referred to as disparate voting rights plans) to concentrate voting
control in management's hands. Their effect is most easily demonstrated
by considering the simplest type of disparate voting rights plan: a char-
ter amendment creating two classes of common stock. The Class A
shares are simply the preexisting common stock, having one vote per
share. The newly created Class B shares, distributed to the shareholders
as a stock dividend, have most of the attributes of regular common stock,
but possess an abnormally large number of votes (usually ten) per share.
Class B shares typically are not transferable, but may be converted into
Class A shares for sale. Normal shareholder turnover thus concentrates
the superior voting shares in the hands of long-term investors, especially
incumbent managers, giving them voting control without the investment
of any additional funds.
As dual class stock became more common, calls went out for federal
regulation. In July 1988, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC
or Commission) responded by adopting rule 19c-4.4 In effect, rule 19c-4
amended the rules of the self-regulatory organizations (SROs) to prohibit
an issuer's equity securities from being listed on a national securities ex-
change or traded through the National Association of Securities Dealers
Automated Quotation system (NASDAQ) if the company issued securi-
ties or took other corporate action nullifying, restricting, or disparately
reducing the voting rights of existing shareholders.5 While not a strict
4. The Securities Act of 1933 allocated regulatory authority under the Act to the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC). The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act or Act) created the
Securities and Exchange Commission and transferred to it the powers originally granted to the FTC.
15 U.S.C. § 78d (1988). References to the FTC in the legislative history discussed herein should
thus be understood as referring to the SEC.
5. As a technical matter, rule 19c-4 added a new rule to the listing standards of each national
securities exchange making available transaction reports under Exchange Act rule I lAa3-1, 17
C.F.R. § 240.llAa3-1 (1990), and each national securities association registered under Exchange
Act section 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1988). Registered exchanges and securities associations are
collectively referred to as self-regulatory organizations (SROs). See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(26) (1988).
The new listing standards created by rule 19c-4 prohibited a covered exchange from listing or
continuing to list the equity securities of an issuer that takes one of the prohibited actions. It like-
wise prohibited a covered securities association from authorizing the equity securities of such an
issuer for quotation and/or transaction reporting on an automated quotation system. The Inter-
mountain and Spokane Stock Exchanges were the only national securities exchanges excluded from
coverage. The National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) was the only securities associa-
tion affected by the rule, just as the NASDAQ system was the only affected automated quotation
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one-share/onervote standard, rule 19c-4 placed substantial limitations on
the ability of U.S. corporations to adopt disparate voting rights plans.
After a brief description in Part I of dual class capital structures, Part
II of this Article evaluates rule 19c-4 and the Commission's arguments as
to the need for regulation of dual class stock. In essence, the Commis-
sion argued that shareholders were being forced to accept certain types of
dual class transactions without having any meaningful voice in the mat-
ter. Part II demonstrates that dual class transactions are objectionable
not because of these so-called collective action problems, but because of
the conflict of interest inherent in management's decision to propose such
transactions.
Once dual class stock is seen as a conflict of interest problem, the ques-
tion arises as to whether the SEC had authority to adopt rule 19c-4.
Conflict of interest transactions traditionally are a matter of state law;
indeed, rule 19c-4 was the SEC's first substantive regulation of conflict of
interest transactions generally applicable to public corporations.6 More
generally, it also was the SEC's most direct regulation of corporate gov-
ernance to date. In June 1990, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia invalidated rule 19c-4 on the grounds that the
Commission had exceeded the statutory authority delegated to it by Con-
gress.7 Part III argues that the court of appeals' decision was correct in
light of the Exchange Act's literal language, its legislative history, and its
historical context. Part III concludes by examining some of the broader
implications of the D.C. Circuit's opinion for future SEC regulation of
corporate governance, proxies, and takeovers.
Because the SEC decided not to seek en banc or Supreme Court review
of the D.C. Circuit panel's decision, the battleground has shifted back to
the states and the SROs. As of this writing, two of the principal SROs
have adopted listing standards modelled on rule 19c-4. Part IV of this
Article argues that the SROs are an appropriate forum in which to ad-
system. Finally, only those issuers registered with the SEC pursuant to Exchange Act section 12, 15
US.C. § 781 (1988), were covered by the rule. Exchange Act Release No. 25891 (July 7, 1988),
[1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,247 at 89,208-09 [hereinafter Adopting
Release].
6. The SEC had previously attempted to substantively regulate the fairness of going private
transactions, which raise conflict of interest concerns comparable to those posed by dual class stock.
In the face of objections that it lacked statutory authority to do so, the SEC settled for adopting new
disclosure rules applicable to such transactions. See Exchange Act Release No. 16,075 (Aug. 2,
1979), 44 Fed. Reg. 46,736 (1979).
7. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
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dress the conflict of interest potentially present in dual class transactions,
but that simply grafting rule 19c-4 into SRO listing standards is the
wrong answer to the problem. Instead, Part IV offers an alternative reg-
ulatory scheme.
I. MODERN DUAL CLASS STOCK PLANS
While limitations on shareholder voting rights are as old as the corpo-
rate form itself, the story of modern dual class capital structures effec-
tively begins in the early years of the 1900s.8 By 1900, the vast majority
of U.S. corporations operated on a one vote per share basis.9 State cor-
poration statutes of the period, however, merely established the one-
share/one-vote principle as a default rule.10 Corporations were free to
deviate from the statutory standard, II and a growing number began to do
so. Many corporations, for example, issued two classes of common
stock: one with full voting rights on a one vote per share basis, the other
with no voting rights (but perhaps with greater dividend rights).1"
8. Useful discussions of voting rights prior to the 1920s can be found in J. BLANDI, MARY-
LAND BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 1783-1852, at 63-69 (1934); 4 J. DAVIS, ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER
HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS 323-25 (1917); 1 W. ScoTr, THE CONSTITUTION AND
FINANCE OF ENGLISH, SCOTTISH AND IRISH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES TO 1720, at 228, 340-41
(1912); Kerbel, An Examination of Nonvoting and Limited Voting Common Shares-Their History,
Legality, and Validity, 15 SEC. REG. L.J. 37 (1987); Ratner, The Government of Business Corpora-
tions: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1970);
Williston, History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800 (Part 11), 2 HARV. L. REV. 149
(1888).
9. Stevens, Stockholders' Voting Rights and the Centralization of Voting Control, 40 Q.J.
ECON. 353, 354 (1926).
10. New York's General Corporation Law of 1909, for example, entitled each shareholder to
one vote per share "[u]nless otherwise provided in the certificate of incorporation." 1909 N.Y.
Laws, ch. 28, § 23, reprinted in J. ARNOLD, NEW YORK BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 39 (4th ed.
1911).
11. See, eg., Bartlett v. Fourton, 115 La. 26, 38 So. 882 (1905); General Inv. Co. v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 87 N.J. Eq. 234, 100 A. 347 (N.J. Ch. 1917); People ex rel. Browne v. Keonig, 133 App.
Div. 756, 118 N.Y.S. 136 (1909); St. Regis Candies, Inc. v. Hovas, 117 Tex. 313, 3 S.W.2d 429 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1928).
12. 1 A. DEWING, THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 163 (5th ed. 1953). A related
development took place with respect to the voting rights of preferred shares. In the early part of this
century, most preferred shares had voting rights equal to those of the common shares. Stevens,
supra note 9, at 354. Gradually, however, corporations began granting voting rights to preferred
shares only in the event of certain contingencies (such as non-payment of dividends). While contro-
versial at the time, this practice is the modem norm. Compare Stevens, supra note 9, at 389-91 with
V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 224-26 (3d
ed. 1987).
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While disparate voting rights plans gained popularity with corporate
managers, and investors showed a surprising willingness to purchase
large amounts of nonvoting common stock, an increasingly vocal opposi-
tion also emerged in the 1920s. William Z. Ripley, a Harvard professor
of political economy, was the most prominent (or at least the most out-
spoken) proponent of equal voting rights. According to Ripley, nonvot-
ing stock was the "crowning infamy" in a series of developments
designed to disenfranchise public investors."3 In essence, his was an early
version of the conflict of interest argument: promoters used nonvoting
common stock as a way of maintaining voting control for themselves. By
issuing the voting common stock to insiders and nonvoting common
stock to the public, promoters raised considerable sums without losing
control of the enterprise. 4
The opposition to nonvoting common stock came to a head with the
New York Stock Exchange's (NYSE) 1925 decision to list Dodge Broth-
ers, Inc. for trading. Dodge sold a total of $130 million worth of bonds,
preferred stock, and nonvoting common shares to the public. Dodge was
controlled, however, by an investment banking firm, which had paid only
$2.25 million for its voting common stock.I5 In January 1926, the NYSE
responded to the resulting public outcry by announcing a new position:
Without at this time attempting to formulate a definite policy, attention
should be drawn to the fact that in the future the committee, in considering
applications for the listing of securities, will give careful thought to the mat-
ter of voting control. 1 6
This policy gradually hardened, until the NYSE in 1940 formally an-
nounced a flat rule against listing nonvoting common stock.'" Although
occasional exceptions arose, the most prominent being the 1956 listing of
Ford Motor Company despite its dual class capital structure, the basic
policy remained in effect until the mid-1980s.' 8
Ripley had proclaimed the demise of nonvoting common stock as early
13. W. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET 77 (1927).
14. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 75-76
(1932).
15. See Loomis & Rubman, Corporate Governance in Historical Perspective, 8 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 141, 152-53 (1979); Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Right The One Com-
mon Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 687, 694-97 (1986).
16. Seligman, supra note 15, at 697.
17. Id. at 699.
18. The evolution of the NYSE policy is traced in J. SELIGMAN, THE ONE SHARE, ONE VOTE
CONTROVERSY 4-8 (1986); Kerbel, supra note 8, at 57-63; Seligman, supra note 15, at 697-700.
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as 1926.19 He was somewhat premature: in the years between 1927 and
1932, at least 288 corporations issued nonvoting or limited voting rights
shares (almost the same number as between 1919 and 1926)." But the
Great Depression, probably with assistance from the opposition led by
Ripley and the NYSE, finally killed off most disparate voting rights
plans.2" One comprehensive survey, for example, found only thirty issu-
ers with nonvoting or dual class common stock listed on U.S. secondary
markets between 1940 and 1978.22 Even more striking, in no year during
that period were there more than eleven such issuers.2"
After several decades of non-controversial dormancy, dual class capi-
tal structures came back into vogue during the early 1980s. A subse-
quent survey found that thirty-seven of forty-four publicly-traded firms
adopting disparate voting rights plans between 1962 and 1984 did so af-
ter January 1980.24 Another thirty-four corporations created dual class
capital structures between March 1986 and May 1987 alone.2" These
modem plans differed from their earlier counterparts in three critical
ways: motivation, design, and method of implementation.
A desire to raise additional equity capital and simultaneously retain
control in the hands of a founding family or entrepreneurial group,2 6 mo-
tivated many, if not most, disparate voting rights plans adopted during
19. W. RIPLEY, supra note 13, at 122 ("[n]onvoting common stock, then, bears every appear-
ance of being dead-dead beyond recall."). See also A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 14, at 76.
20. 1 A. DEWING, supra note 12, at 161.
21. Dewing attributes their demise solely to the Great Depression, id. at 162, but it seems likely
that the other factors played a role.
22. Lease, McConnell & Mikkelson, The Market Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corpora-
tions, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 439, 450-52 (1983).
23. Id. at 456 (table 2).
24. Partch, The Creation of a Class of Limited Voting Common Stock and Shareholder Wealth,
18 J. FIN. ECON. 313, 314 (1987).
25. SEC OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, UPDATE-THE EFFECTS OF DUAL-CLASS RE-
CAPITALIZATIONS ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH: INCLUDING EVIDENCE FROM 1986 AND 1987 at 2
(July 16, 1987), [hereinafter SECOND SEC STUDY]. An earlier study by the same authors found 65
dual class capital structures created between 1976 and 1986, three-quarters of which were adopted
between 1983 and 1986. SEC OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, THE EFFECTS OF DUAL-CLASS
RECAPITALIZATIONS ON THE WEALTH OF SHAREHOLDERS 11-12 (June 1, 1987) [hereinafter FIRST
SEC STUDY].
26. Many studies have found that corporations with dual class capital structures, especially
those established before the recent wave of recapitalizations, have significant family ownership. E.g.,
DeAngelo & DeAngelo, Managerial Ownership of Voting Rights: A Study of Public Corporations
with Dual Classes of Common Stock, 14 J. FIN. EON. 33, 50 (1985).
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the five decades after the NYSE first announced its policy.27 The revival
of dual class capital structures in the 1980s, however, was almost cer-
tainly motivated by managerial concerns about the decade's significant
rise in the number of hostile takeovers.28 For managers of potential take-
over targets, the surest takeover defense is possession of voting control.
A corporate raider by definition cannot oust incumbents who can outvote
it. Even less than majority control may help managers fend off hostile
takeovers; for example, by making it easier to obtain shareholder ap-
proval of other types of takeover defenses.
Management can obtain voting control in two ways. 29 One is a so-
called going private transaction, typically structured as a leveraged
buyout, in which management purchases the shareholdings of public in-
vestors. This technique, of course, requires management to increase sub-
stantially its equity investment in the firm. A less costly alternative from
management's perspective is the creation of a disparate voting rights
plan." Indeed, proxy statements seeking shareholder approval of a dual
class recapitalization routinely admit that the plan will reduce the likeli-
27. See generally id. at 51-55; see also Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual
Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 119, 136-40 (1987); Kerbel, supra note 8, at 43-46.
28. Professor Fischel has argued that dual class stock should not necessarily be regarded as a
species of takeover defenses. Fischel, supra note 27, at 149-51. Cf. Comments of the United States
Department of Justice at 15-17, In re Self-Regulatory Organizations; Proposed Rule Change by New
York Stock Exchange (SEC 1986) (No. SR-NYSE-86-17) (dual class capital structures should not
significantly impede takeover bids) [hereinafter DOJ Comments]. Other commentators, however,
are virtually unanimous in regarding the recent wave of dual class recapitalizations as having been
inspired by the takeover mania of the 1980s. See, eg., J. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 10; Ruback,
Coercive Dual-Class Exchange Offers, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 153 (1988); Buxbaum, The Internal Division
of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1671, 1713-15 (1985); Dent, Dual Class
Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 725, 726 (1986); Gordon,
Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder Choice, 76 CALIF. L.
REV. 3, 4 (1988).
29. See generally Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock- The Relevance of Substitutes,
73 VA. L. REV. 807 (1987) (arguing that in a perfect market leveraged buyouts and dual class recapi-
talizations are functionally identical).
30. A technique related to dual class recapitalizations involves granting voting rights to holders
of debt securities. Although this right is often restricted to voting on acquisitions or other changes in
control of the issuer, it may have a takeover deterrent effect if bondholders believe they are systemat-
ically disadvantaged by takeovers and thus can be expected to vote against acquisitions. See 2 R.
WINTER, R. ROSENBAUM, M. STUMPF, G. HAWKINS & L. PARKER, SHARK REPELLENTS AND
GOLDEN PARACHUTES: A HANDBOOK FOR THE PRACTICIONER 262.1-63 (Supp. 1990) [hereinafter
SHARK REPELLENTS]; eg., Proxy Statement of South Carolina Nat'l Corp. (Oct. 26, 1981), re-
printed in id. at 306-09 (1983).
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hood of a hostile takeover.31
While there are various forms of disparate voting rights plans and vari-
ous techniques of implementing them, they all share one common
theme-concentration of voting power in the hands of incumbent man-
agers and their allies.32 The basic dual class recapitalization is a good
example. Shareholders approve a charter amendment creating two
classes-typically referred to as Class A and Class B-of common stock.
The Class A shares are essentially the preexisting common stock under a
new name, retaining all of its former attributes, including the usual one
vote per share. The Class B shares possess all of the attributes of com-
mon stock, with three exceptions: (1) ownership of Class B stock may
not be transferred except to certain specified persons, such as the holder's
spouse and heirs; (2) Class B shares, however, may be converted into
shares of Class A, which are freely transferable; and (3) the Class B stock
has a larger number of votes, usually ten, per share. The Class B shares
are then distributed to the shareholders as a stock dividend on their ex-
isting common shares.33
Because the Class B shares are not transferable, if a shareholder wishes
to sell her shares of Class B stock, she must first convert them into shares
of Class A. (An improper transfer automatically results in conversion.)
Over time, as public investors adjust their portfolios by selling out of the
company, the number of outstanding Class B shares accordingly falls. In
contrast, long-term investors-especially incumbent managers-retain
their Class B shares, concentrating the superior voting shares in manage-
ment's hands.34 Management thus may eventually obtain voting control
without ever investing any additional equity in the firm.35 Moreover, the
31. Partch, supra note 24, at 315, 312-22 (although noting that few proxy statements said that
deterring hostile takeovers was the primary purpose of the proposal).
32. Many studies have found that corporate management tends to own the bulk of the superior
voting rights shares and hence to possess voting control after the recapitalization. However, in many
companies (especially those adopting dual class capital structures prior to the recent resurgence of
such plans), management already owned an unusually large proportion of the voting shares prior to
the recapitalization. Eg., DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 26, at 44-45, 61; FIRsT SEC STUDY,
supra note 25, at 27-28; Partch, supra note 24, at 314-15, 319-21; cf. Stevens, supra note 9, at 385-86
(dual class plans of 1920s also had the effect of concentrating voting control in hands of insiders).
The latter finding may be explained by the possibility that such managers were more confident of
obtaining shareholder approval of the recapitalization transaction.
33. SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 30, at 270.2-70.3 (Supp. 1990); e.g., Proxy Statement of
Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. (Feb. 23, 1987), reprinted in id. at 374.50-77-74.50-113 (Supp.
1988).
34. FiRsT SEC STUDY, supra note 25, at 13.
35. In some cases, the lesser-voting rights class is guaranteed the right to elect a specified
[Vol. 69:565
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plan's antitakeover effect is immediate, as the restrictions on transferabil-
ity preclude an offeror from acquiring the Class B stock.
A closely related alternative involves issuing the Class B shares, previ-
ously created by appropriate charter amendments, in an exchange offer.
Shareholders are invited to exchange their existing Class A stock for the
higher-voting rights Class B shares. In these cases, however, the Class B
shares typically possess lesser dividend rights and a concomitant lower
dividend rate. Accordingly, most public investors will not exchange
their shares. If only management and its allies acquire the higher-voting
right shares, an exchange offer dual class recapitalization may effectively
give management immediate voting control.3 6
Other types of disparate voting rights plans produce similar takeover
defensive effects. For example, a few corporations revived the concept of
imposing a ceiling on the percentage of voting rights that any individual
shareholder may possess. Regardless of the number of shares owned by a
shareholder, that shareholder is treated as owning not more than the
specified percentage of voting power-usually ten percent or less. 7 The
intended takeover deterrent effect of such plans is especially apparent in
those cases in which the plan provides a waiver of the voting rights cap as
to shareholders who make a tender offer, subject to the satisfaction of a
number of conditions, at a fair price to all shareholders. Thus, the voting
rights cap purportedly assures that any acquirer will pay a fair price."
Yet another approach, time-phased voting rights, amends the corpora-
tion's articles of incorporation to give the holders of its common stock
ten votes per share. However, subsequent purchasers are entitled to only
one vote per share until they have held the shares for some specified time
number of directors (voting as a class separate from the superior voting rights shares). But since the
number allotted to the Class A holders is always a minority, the Class B holders retain effective
control. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 11.
36. SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 30, at 270.3-.4 (Supp. 1990); eg., Proxy Statement of
Fedders Corp. (Mar. 26, 1985), reprinted in id. at 374.24-.49 (Supp. 1985). This outcome is usefully
illustrated by the following example: suppose that management owned slightly more than nine per-
cent of the original common stock, the new voting ratio is ten to one, and only management partici-
pates in the exchange; on these facts, management will possess greater than 50 percent of the
corporation's voting power following the exchange. Gordon, supra note 28, at 40-41; Gilson, supra
note 29, at 813.
37. E.g., Proxy Statement of MCI Communications Corp. (July 29, 1981), reprinted in SHARK
REPELLENTS, supra note 30, at 311-30 (Supp. 1985); Proxy Statement of Figgie International Inc.
(July 7, 1983), reprinted in id. at 330-38 (1983); Proxy Statement of Heights Finance Corp. (Apr. 21,
1983), reprinted in id. at 338-56 (1983).
38. See SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 30, at 264 (Supp. 1989).
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period (typically several years). Thereafter, the holder becomes entitled
to ten votes per share.3 9 Time-phased voting plans have a significant an-
titakeover effect, as they dramatically increase the number of shares an
offeror must acquire to achieve immediate voting control."
II. RULE 19c-4 AND THE NEED FOR REGULATION
When the rule 19c-4 controversy began, corporate voting rights were
subject to two basic sets of rules: state law and SRO listing standards.
State law generally provided (as it still does) considerable flexibility. Vir-
tually all states use one vote per common share as the default rule, but
allow corporations to depart from the norm by adopting appropriate pro-
visions in their organic documents.4' Only two states diverge from this
pattern in their corporation statutes, 42 although the blue sky laws of
about one-third restrict the sale of at least some disparate voting rights
shares.43 Courts have also routinely upheld dual class capital
39. Id. at 270.2 (Supp. 1990); e.g., Proxy Statement of American Family Corp. (Apr. 22, 1985)
(requiring 48 month holding period), reprinted in id. at 374.16-11-374.23 (Supp. 1988).
40. SHARK REPELLENTS, supra note 30, at 270.2 (Supp. 1990); Buxbaum, supra note 28, at
1718-19. Additional variants on these basic themes are described in J. SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at
11-15; FIRST SEC STUDY, supra note 25, at 12-19; Note, Dual Class Recapitalization and Share-
holder Voting Rights, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 106, 110-11 (1987).
41. See 1 MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 6.01, at 317 (3d ed. 1984 & 1990 Supp.) [here-
inafter MBCA ANN.]; eg., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION AcT § 6.01 (1985); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151, 212(a) (1983).
42. Mo. ANN. STAT § 351.180 (Vernon 1966 & Supp. 1990) (prohibiting limitation or denial of
voting rights); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-2014 (1987) (requiring all holders of common shares to have
the right to vote in election of directors, although otherwise permitting variations in voting rights).
A few federal statutes also regulate the use of dual class stock, but these statutes are limited to a
relatively small number of companies. Eg., 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a) (1988) (companies reorganizing
under the Bankruptcy Act must prohibit nonvoting equity stock and provide an appropriate distri-
bution of voting power among all equity classes); 15 U.S.C. § 79g(c) (1988) (requiring fair distribu-
tion of voting power among classes of stock issued by registered public utility holding companies); 15
U.S.C. § 80a-18(i) (1988) (certain registered investment companies must provide equal voting rights
to all shares, absent SEC exemption). In contrast, a few federally chartered corporations are prohib.
ited from issuing voting shares to the public; this class, however, is limited to a select group of firms
that are really quasi-governmental agencies, such as the Student Loan Marketing Association. See
Kerbel, supra note 8, at 39.
43. Alabama Rule 830-X-4.13, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 7453 (Nov. 1990); Alaska Rules
§ 3 AAC 08.210, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 8434 (Nov. 1980); Arkansas Rule 405.07, 1 Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) % 10,448 (Oct. 1989); California Rule 260.140.1, 1 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 9 11,851
(Oct. 1985); Florida Rule 3E-700.006, IA Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 17,476 (Nov. 1990); Indiana
Rules § 710 IAC 1-12-4, 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCII) % 24,590 (Apr. 1990); Kansas Rules § 81-7-
l(i), 1A Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCII) % 26,407 (Apr. 1988); Minnesota Rules pt. 2875.3080, IA Blue Sky
L. Rep. (CCH) % 33,501 (Sept. 1989); Missouri Rules § 30-52.110, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH)
35,461 (Mar. 1990); Nebraska Rules tit. 48, ch. 8, 2 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 37,408 (Mar. 1984);
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SRO listing standards thus provided the major restraint on dual class
capitalizations prior to the adoption of rule 19c-4. In addition to its pol-
icy of not listing nonvoting common stock, the NYSE refused to list the
voting common stock of any issuer having a class of nonvoting common
stock outstanding and, in effect, refused to list issuers having two or more
classes of common stock with disparate voting rights.45 The AMEX like-
wise refused to list nonvoting common stock,' but it adopted a more
flexible policy with respect to disparate voting rights plans. Issuers
adopting such plans would be listed as long as the plan satisfied certain
guidelines designed to create a minimum level of participation to which
the lesser voting rights class was entitled.47 In contrast, the National
Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) imposed no voting rights list-
ing standards in either the over-the-counter market or the NASDAQ
system.4 s
Texas Rule § 113.3(6), 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 55,583 (Nov. 1990); Wisconsin Rules § SEC
3.07, 3 Blue Sky L. Rep. (CCH) 64,527 (Dec. 1990); see also North American Securities Adminis-
trators Association, Statement of Policy on Non-voting Stock, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 2,401 (non-
voting or disparate voting rights stock considered unfair and inequitable to public investors).
44. E.g., Hampton v. Tri-State Fin. Corp., 30 Colo. App. 420, 425, 495 P.2d 566, 569 (1972);
Providence and Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121, 122-24 (Del. 1977); Deskins v. Lawrence
County Fair & Dev. Corp., 321 S.W.2d 408, 409 (Ky. 1959); Groves v. Rosemound Improvement
Ass'n, 413 So. 2d 925, 927 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 420 So. 2d 443 (La. 1982); Shapiro v.
Tropicana Lanes, Inc., 371 S.W.2d 237, 241-42 (Mo. 1963).
In People ex rel. Watseka Tel. Co. v. Emmerson, 302 Ill. 300, 134 N.E. 707 (1922), the Illinois
Supreme Court invalidated a class of nonvoting preferred stock as conflicting with the Illinois State
Constitution's corporate voting rights provision. However, in Stroh v. Blackhawk Holding Corp., 48
Ill. 2d 471, 272 N.E.2d 1 (1971), the court upheld against constitutional challenge a class of shares
having full voting, but no economic, rights. The troublesome constitutional provision was repealed
in 1970. See Roanoke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar, 101 Ill. 2d 315, 461 N.E.2d 1365 (1984). West Vir-
ginia went through a similar process. See Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corp., 146 W. Va. 543,
122 S.E.2d 436 (1961); State ex rel. Dewey Portland Cement Co. v. O'Brien, 142 W. Va. 451, 96
S.E.2d 171 (1956).
45. NYSE Listed Company Manual §§ 308.00, 313.00 & 802.00 (1983).
46. AMEX Company Guide § 122 (1968).
47. The most important of these policies requires that the lesser-voting rights class, voting as a
class, must have the ability to elect not less than one quarter of the board of directors and that the
voting ratio on other matters may not exceed ten to one. The full policy statement is reprinted in J.
SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 9.
48. Shortly before rule 19c-4 was proposed, the NASD began considering voting rights listing
standards. Memorandum from NASD to All NASD Members and Other Interested Persons, Re-
quest for Comments on Shareholder Voting Rights Proposal for NASDAQ Companies (May 28,
1987) (copy on file with Washington University Law Quarterly); see also NASD Governors Clear
Voting Rule for Shareholders, Wall St. J., May 18, 1987, at 30, col. 3. This development was largely
motivated by the NASD's desire to obtain an exemption for NASDAQ securities, comparable to
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The NYSE's refusal to list dual class shares almost certainly was the
major factor in enforcing their long sojourn in obscure comers of corpo-
rate financing. Until quite recently, the NYSE possessed significant ad-
vantages over all of its competitors. The greater liquidity of NYSE
securities probably lowered listed issuers' cost of capital.49 Listing also
conferred considerable prestige on the firm and its managers." Listed
companies desired to remain so, while many unlisted firms sought eligi-
bility for listing as their primary goal. As a result, few companies chal-
lenged the Exchange's policy on disparate voting rights. Changes in the
secondary trading market during the 1980s, however, dramatically en-
hanced the feasibility of disparate voting rights plans. The emergence of
NASDAQ as a viable alternative to exchange listing5 initiated the clos-
ing of the liquidity and prestige gap between the exchanges and the over-
the-counter market. 52 Indeed, a growing number of companies that be-
came eligible for NYSE or AMEX listings chose to remain on
NASDAQ. 5 3
Given the ability of disparate voting rights plans to insulate manage-
ment from the threat of hostile takeovers, it was not surprising that a
substantial number of NYSE-listed firms demanded the right to adopt
such plans.5 Given the NYSE's weakened competitive posture vis-a-vis
that enjoyed by NYSE and AMEX securities, from state blue sky laws. See Seligman, supra note 15,
at 705-06.
49. See Sanger & McConnell, Stock Exchange Listings, Firm Value, and Security Market Effi-
ciency: The Impact of NASDAQ, 21 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANAL. 1 (1986); Note, Stock Exchange
Listing Agreements as a Vehicle for Corporate Governance, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1427, 1437 n.48
(1981) (citing unpublished SEC study).
50. Gordon, supra note 28, at 6; Kerbel, supra note 8, at 62.
51. All securities transactions that do not take place on a stock exchange are said to occur in
the over-the-counter (OTC) market. Bid and asked quotations for OTC securities traditionally were
listed only daily in a publication known as the sheets or pink sheets. As a result, OTC stocks were
less liquid than exchange securities. The NASDAQ is a computer network providing access (de-
pending on the level of service chosen) to quotations and transaction reports for many OTC securi-
ties and allowing market makers to change quotations. It has thereby made NASDAQ shares much
more liquid. The development of improved telephone and computerized communication networks
between brokers has even further enhanced the liquidity of the OTC market. But some OTC shares
continue to be listed on the old pink sheets and thus remain relatively less liquid.
52. According to one post-NASDAQ study, NYSE listing no longer conferred statistically sig-
nificant stock price benefits on shareholders. Sanger & McConnell, supra note 49, at 19.
53. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the Tender
Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1257-58 (1984).
54. The initial, or at least the most prominent, action by a NYSE-listed issuer was General
Motors Corporation's 1984 announcement that it intended to issue a class of stock having one-half
vote per share as consideration in its acquisition of Electronic Data System. A number of other
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its less restrictive competitors, it was also not surprising that the NYSE
reconsidered its policy against dual class stock." In 1984, the NYSE
announced a moratorium on enforcement of the relevant listing stan-
dards and established a committee to study the problem. 6 In 1986, pur-
suant to Exchange Act section 19(b),57 the Exchange requested SEC
approval of a modified rule allowing the NYSE to list dual class stock if a
majority of the issuer's independent directors and "public" shareholders
approved the recapitalization. s
At this point, the SEC had at least three options: (1) approve the
NYSE's request, allowing greater competition amongst the SROs for list-
ings; (2) disallow the proposed change, probably doing further damage to
the NYSE's competitive position; or (3) adopt a single rule applicable to
all SROs.5 9 After hearings, and a failed effort to reach a voluntary com-
promise,' the Commission chose the third route. It declined to act on
NYSE companies shortly thereafter proposed to adopt disparate voting rights plans. Adopting Re-
lease, supra note 5, at 89,209.
55. The NYSE admitted that the growing competition for listings among the major SROs was a
motivating factor behind its proposal. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,209. Most commenta-
tors also saw competition with the other SROs as an important (if not the) motivating factor behind
the Exchange's action. See Gordon, supra note 28, at 6; Harris, SEC Holds Hearing on Proposal to
Alter Rule on Voting Stock, Legal Times, Dec. 22, 1986, at 16; Kerbel, supra note 8, at 63; Seligman,
supra note 15, at 700-01; Troy, Is a "One Share, One Vote" Rule a Good Idea?, Nat'l L.J., July 6,
1987, at 32.
56. The NYSE background to rule 19c-4 is traced in Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,209-
10; see also Exchange Act Release No. 24623 (June 22, 1987), [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 84,143 [hereinafter Proposing Release]; Exchange Act Release No. 23803 (Nov. 13,
1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 41,715 (1986).
57. Section 19(b) requires SEC approval of any proposed new SRO rules or changes to existing
SRO rules. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1988).
58. "Public" shareholders were defined to exclude directors, officers and affiliates of the issuer.
No approval requirements were imposed with respect to dual class stock issued in IPOs or spin-offs.
Listed companies that adopted disparate voting rights plans during the moratorium would have two
years to comply with the shareholder approval requirement. Exchange Act Release No. 23803
(Nov. 13, 1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 41,715 (1986); Exchange Act Release No. 23724 (Oct. 17, 1986), 51
Fed. Reg. 37,529 (1986). The proposal would not have affected the NYSE's prohibition of nonvot-
ing common stock. Testimony of John J. Phelan, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the New
York Stock Exchange, Hearings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission 2 (Dec. 16, 1986)
(copy on file with Washington University Law Quarterly) [hereinafter Phelan Testimony].
59. Actions by other SROs briefly complicated the SEC's options, although in both cases the
situation was resolved fairly easily. In December 1986, the AMEX filed a proposed rule change
eliminating its partial restrictions on dual class stock. The filing was withdrawn in April 1987. The
Pacific Stock Exchange likewise filed a proposed rule allowing dual class stock. Its proposal was
mooted by the adoption of rule 19c-4. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,209-10, nn.11 & 19.
60. Beginning in March 1987, several months before rule 19c-4 was proposed, members of the
SEC staff met with representatives of the AMEX, NASD, and NYSE. They considered an approach
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the NYSE proposal, instead proposing rule 19c-4 as a uniform standard
applicable to all securities markets. 61  In July 1988, after more than a
year's deliberation, the SEC finally adopted a modified version of rule
19c-4.62
Acknowledging that dual class stock had some legitimate (or, at least,
unobjectionable) uses, the SEC rejected proposals for a strict one-
share/one-vote standard. Undoubtedly, this was the correct decision,
although for reasons different than those advanced by the Commission.
The SEC's position rested on two basic grounds. First, the empirical
evidence as to the effect of dual class stock on shareholder wealth was
unclear and, at best, inconclusive. Second, the Commission appeared un-
persuaded by the various theoretical arguments in favor of a flat prohibi-
tion 3 In contrast, this Article reaches the same result on the different
ground that dual class stock transactions should be regulated only when
they pose a significant conflict between the interests of managers and
shareholders. Because some dual class transactions do not raise such
concerns, a flat prohibition is unwarranted. Interestingly, however, as
the following sections demonstrate a conflict of interest-based sieve
would pick up most of the same transactions regulated by rule 19c-4.
As adopted, rule 19c-4 prohibited only those corporate actions having
the effect of nullifying, restricting, or disparately reducing the per share
voting rights of existing common stock shareholders of the company. 4
In addition, the Commission specifically addressed a number of plan
pursuant to which all of the major SROs would voluntarily adopt rules comparable to that then
under consideration by the NASD. Memorandum from Brandon Becker, Assoc. Director, Division
of Market Regulation, to SEC File Nos. 4-308 and S7-22-87, Meetings Between the Self-Regulatory
Organizations Staff and the Commission Staff to Discuss a Rule Regarding Shareholder Voting
Rights (June 23, 1987) (copy on file with Washington University Law Quarterly). Like earlier efforts
in this vein during 1985, see Phelan Testimony, supra note 58, at 7, the negotiations eventually
collapsed-reportedly because of resistance by AMEX. See 2 Corp. Couns. Weekly (BNA) No. 23,
at 1 (June 10, 1987); 2 Corp. Couns. Weekly (BNA) No. 22, at I (June 6, 1987); 19 Sec. Reg. & L.
Rep. (BNA) 667-68 (May 8, 1987); see generally Proposing Release, supra note 56, at 88,770-71.
61. Proposing Release, supra note 56.
62. Adopting Release, supra note 5.
63. The SEC's arguments are not addressed in detail, as they raise questions largely beyond the
scope of this Article. The major empirical studies of dual class stock include: FIRST SEC STUDY,
supra note 25; Gordon, supra note 28; Lease, McConnell & Mikkelson, supra note 22; Partch, supra
note 24; SECOND SEC STUDY, supra note 25. The major theoretical analyses of a flat prohibition
include: DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 26; Fischel, supra note 27; Gilson, supra note 29;
Gordon, supra note 28; Grossman & Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Con-
trol, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 175 (1988); Harris & Raviv, Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Major-
ity Rules, 20 J. FIN. EON. 203 (1988).
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.19c-4 (1990). In general, implementation and subsequent interpretation of
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types: presumptively prohibiting some, presumptively permitting others,
and leaving still more for case-by-case analysis.65
A. Prohibited Transactions
The types of dual class transactions presumptively prohibited by the
rule included time-phased voting rights plans, capped voting plans, issu-
ances of shares with per share voting rights greater than those of existing
common shares, and exchange offers in which full voting common stock
was exchanged for lesser-voting common shares.6 6 Although transfera-
bility restrictions are generally regarded as critical to their antitakeover
effect, rule 19c-4 presumptively prohibited super-voting shares even in
the absence of such restrictions. 67 Likewise, it prohibited exchange offers
even when the lesser-voting rights shares carried a dividend preference;
exchange offers in which common shares were exchanged for non-voting
debt securities or preferred stock, however, were to be analyzed on a
case-by-case basis, and only those transactions determined to produce the
prohibited "disenfranchising" effects would trigger the rule.68
While most such plans create pronounced anti-takeover effects, collec-
tive shareholder action problems were the stated justification for prohib-
iting them.69 For example, some transactions, especially exchange offers,
were said to involve direct shareholder coercion. A rational shareholder
faced with a dual class exchange offer knows that corporate insiders
likely will obtain voting control if it is successful. However, the restric-
tions on transferability often placed on the super-voting shares and their
lower dividend rate make exchanging her shares unattractive. If the
shareholder retains her shares, she at least obtains the substantial divi-
dend preference typically granted to the lesser-voting rights shares. Re-
taining her shares is thus in her best interest. If all shareholders are
the rule were left to the SROs, subject to SEC review under section 19(b). See Adopting Release,
supra note 5, at 89,218.
65. In addition, it should be noted that the rule entirely exempted foreign issuers and
grandfathered domestic issuers which adopted disparate voting rights capital structures prior to July
7, 1988. Id. at 89,222-23. Grandfathered plans were not to operate so as to exacerbate the disparity
in relative voting power. Thus, issuances of additional shares under such plans generally were re-
quired to maintain the existing proportional voting rights of all classes. Id. at 89,223.
66. Id. at 89,220-22.
67. Id. at 89,221.
68. Id. at 89,221-22 & n.105.
69. See id. at 89,216; see also id. at 89,235 (Grundfest, C., concurring); Proposing Release,
supra note 56, at 88,773 -74. For purposes of this Article, the term "collective action problem" shall
refer collectively to shareholder apathy, coercion, and valuation concerns.
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rational, all will reach the same conclusion and will approve the transac-
tion, even though it may not be in the best interests of the outside share-
holders collectively.7"
Proponents of rule 19c-4 argued that collective action problems also
arose in other types of dual class recapitalizations. In many recapitaliza-
tions, outside investors hold a majority of the firm's ex ante voting
power; in many more, outsiders could expect to achieve aggregate voting
control in the future via sales by insiders and additional equity offer-
ings.7 A recapitalization may transfer voting control to insiders, how-
ever, without the outside common shareholders having any meaningful
say in the matter. Rational shareholder apathy supposedly results in
routine approval of dual class recapitalizations despite the subsequent
loss of voting rights.72 According to the theory, a rational shareholder
will expend the effort to make an informed decision only if the expected
benefits of doing so outweigh its costs. Given the length and complexity
of proxy statements, the opportunity cost entailed in reading them before
voting is quite high and very apparent, while few apparent benefits are
received. Accordingly, shareholders can be expected to assign a rela-
tively low value to the expected benefits of careful consideration. The
necessary investment of time and effort in making informed voting deci-
sions simply is not worthwhile. Most shareholders will therefore vote to
approve a dual class transaction regardless of its impact on their inter-
ests. An informed, objecting minority supposedly is thus effectively dis-
enfranchised, even though they purchased their shares with the
expectation of full voting rights.7 3
This concern is inconsistent with corporate law's historic focus on ma-
jority rule. Collective action problems are present virtually whenever
shareholders are asked to make decisions. Yet the majority has long
70. The coercive effect of dual class exchange offers is thus quite similar to that of two-tier
offers. See generally Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,221-22; FIRsT SEC STUDY, supra note
25, at 8; Gilson, supra note 29, at 832-40. But see Dent, supra note 28, at 740-41.
71. Proposing Release, supra note 56, at 88,778. A proponent of dual class stock might argue
that rational shareholders would have anticipated the possibility of being disenfranchised and dis-
counted it in determining whether or not to purchase shares. However, given the difficulty of pre-
dicting the likelihood of a dual class recapitalization and the difficulty of measuring its effect on
share prices, it seems unlikely that shareholders would be able to fully discount the stock price ex
ante.
72. E.g., Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,235-36 (Grundfest, C., concurring); Gordon,
supra note 28, at 43-47; Note, supra note 40, at 117-120. For a general discussion of rational share-
holder apathy, see R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 390-92 (1986).
73. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,216; Proposing Release, supra note 56, at 88,778.
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been allowed to impose its will on a strenuously objecting minority, ab-
sent some conflict of interest, even in transactions as fundamental as
changes in control.74 Moreover, the existence of a supposedly informed,
objecting minority seems inconsistent with the shareholder apathy theory
on which the argument is based. The SEC, nevertheless, accepted the
collective action argument. It therefore chose to prohibit not only ex-
change offers and super-voting blank check preferred, but also many
types of recapitalizations effected by charter amendments approved by
shareholders.75
The SEC's decision appeared to rest on two additional grounds. Upon
close examination, however, neither justified the SEC's decision to reject
the traditional focus on majority rule. First, the SEC noted that manage-
ment is able to pressure large holders into supporting the transaction. A
number of corporate managers have exerted significant pressure on insti-
tutional investors to support dual class recapitalizations and other anti-
takeover measures.76 In addition, management's power to set the agenda
and use corporate funds to solicit proxies helps it obtain approval of a
recapitalization.77 These forms of coercion, however, do not justify a
prohibition of dual class stock (they are potentially present any time
shareholders are asked to vote on any issue), as they can be addressed via
the fiduciary duties of managers and institutional investors.
Second, the SEC and some commentators appear to view the higher
dividends often paid on lesser-voting stock as, in effect, a bribe to coerce
shareholders to vote for a proposal they would otherwise reject.78 Grant-
74. See R. GILSON, supra note 3, at 505-06 (discussing evolution from requirement that corpo-
rate mergers receive unanimous approval to the modem rule of majority approval).
75. Because of these collective action problems, the Commission also rejected proposals to ex-
empt transactions approved by a majority of disinterested shareholders. Adopting Release, supra
note 5, at 89,216.
76. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,216; Proposing Release, supra note 56, at 88,773; see
also Testimony of James E. Heard, Deputy Director, Investor Responsibility Research Center,
Hearings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission 2 (July 22, 1987) (copy on file with Wash-
ington University Law Quarterly) [hereinafter Heard Testimony]; J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, CON-
FLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE PROXY VOTING SYSTEM (1987); P. McGURN, CONFIDENTIAL PROXY
VOTING 61-75 (1989); cf. Gordon, supra note 28, at 47-56 (describing other forms of strategic behav-
ior by management). Those institutional investors who are also sellers of services to the corporation
(such as banks, brokers, and investment managers) are more vulnerable to management pressures
than purely buy-side players (such as public pension funds).
77. Proposing Release, supra note 56, at 88,773 n.45.
78. See Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,216; Ruback, supra note 28; cf. Gordon, supra
note 28, at 49 (noting "sweetener" issue and appearing to base his objection on difficulty of measur-
ing its value).
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ing that "dividend sweeteners" may result in some favorable votes that
otherwise might have been unfavorable, I confess to not understanding
the objection. Sweeteners are not uncommon in transactions restructur-
ing the rights of parties, especially when colleclive action problems must
be overcome. Accordingly, if the dividends fully compensate the share-
holders, why should they not be allowed to make that choice?
The answer may be that the higher dividend rate is unlikely to be fully
compensatory, because its value is difficult to measure. Dual class stock
would be unobjectionable if outside shareholders were fully compensated
for any losses they suffer because of their lesser-voting rights. However,
while higher dividends payable on the lesser-voting stock partially com-
pensate shareholders, that compensation may not account fully for the
loss of their voting rights. In any event, it would be very difficult indeed
to measure accurately the transaction's effect on shareholders.
None of the SEC's arguments persuasively answered the question of
why dual class stock should be regulated in the first place. Instead, the
strongest argument against dual class stock rests on conflict of interest
grounds. There is good reason to be suspicious of management's motives
and conduct in certain dual class recapitalizations. Dual class transac-
tions motivated by their antitakeover effects, like all takeover defenses,
pose an obvious potential for conflicts of interest. If a hostile bidder suc-
ceeds, it is almost certain to remove many of the target's incumbent di-
rectors and officers.79 On the other hand, if incumbent management
defeats the bidder, target shareholders are deprived of a substantial pre-
mium for their shares."0 A dual class capital structure, of course, effec-
tively assures the latter outcome.81
79. See Baron, Tender Offers and Management Resistance, 38 J. FIN. 331 (1983); Walking &
Long, Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance, 15 RAND J. ECON. 54
(1984).
80. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders' Wel.
fare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981) and Easterbrook & Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender
Offers?, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 277 (1984) and Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, The Market for Corporate
Controk The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. EcoN. PERSP. 49 (1988) and Jensen & Ruback,
The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5 (1983) with Lipton,
Takeover Bids in The Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979) and Margotta & Marston,
Long-Term Results of Defeated Tender Offers (Working Paper 87-29 1987), reprinted in Corporate
Takeovers Revisited: Policy Implications of Recent Research (Brookings Institution Forum, Sept.
22, 1987).
81. In recent years, courts have imposed increasingly onerous restrictions on management's
ability to fend off hostile takeovers. Eg., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173 (Del. 1985); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). This rule could, and perhaps should, be extended to
[Vol. 69:565
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol69/iss2/6
RESURRECTION OF SEC RULE 19c-4
In addition to this general concern, a distinct source of potential con-
flict between managers' self-interest and the best interests of the share-
holders arises in dual class recapitalizations. An analogy to
management-led leveraged buyouts (MBOs) may be useful. In these
transactions, management has a clear-cut conflict of interest. On the one
hand, they are fiduciaries of the shareholders, charged with getting the
best price for the shareholders. On the other, as buyers, they have a
strong self-interest in paying the lowest possible price.
In dual class recapitalizations, management has essentially the same
conflict of interest. Although they are fiduciaries charged with protect-
ing the shareholders' interests, the disparate voting rights plan typically
will give them voting control. The managers' temptation to act in their
own self-interest is obvious. Yet, unlike MBOs, in a dual class recapitali-
zation, management neither pays for voting control nor is its conduct
subject to meaningful judicial review. As such, the conflict of interest
posed by dual class recapitalizations is even more pronounced than in
MBOs. On the other hand, it must be recognized that only a potential
conflict of interest exists. Accordingly, while rule 19c-4's prohibition of
certain dual class transactions probably was unnecessary, some restric-
tions on dual class recapitalizations are desirable in order to discourage
management's self-interested behavior.
B. Permitted Transactions
The Commission identified a number of dual class transactions as to
which it believed collective action problems were unlikely. These types
of plans, which rule 19c-4 presumptively permitted, include issuance of
disparate voting rights stock in an initial public offering (IPO); subse-
quent issuances of a new class of lower voting stock; and issuance of
lower voting rights stock in a bona fide merger or acquisition.8 2 Interest-
the use of dual class stock as a hostile takeover defense. Cf. Berle, Non-Voting Stock and "Bankers'
Control," 39 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1926) (arguing that fiduciary duties should be imposed on super-
voting rights shareholders).
82. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,219-20. The SEC left for subsequent interpretations
the question of whether a company could issue lower voting rights stock and thereafter issue addi-
tional shares of the original, higher voting rights stock. Id. at 89,219.
The exemption for IPOs would have been of limited utility to those companies most likely to be
subject to a hostile acquisition effort, namely, established publicly-held corporations. However, the
SEC's adopting release took the position that a company, without violating the rule, could be taken
private and subsequently go public in an offering that included a disparate voting rights plan. See id.
at 89,227. This would allow, for example, a company's management to obtain control in a leveraged
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ingly, none of these transactions pose serious risks of self-interested be-
havior by managers.
Dual class IPOs present the clearest case. Public investors who do not
want lesser voting rights stock simply will not buy it. Those who are
willing to purchase it presumably will be compensated by a lower per
share price than full voting rights stock would command and/or by a
higher dividend rate. In any event, assuming full disclosure, they be-
come shareholders knowing that they will have lower voting rights than
the insiders and having accepted as adequate whatever trade-off the firm
offered in recompense.83 Thus, a form of market review effectively con-
strains management's conflict of interest.
The other types of permitted dual class transactions also do not raise
collective action or conflict of interest concerns. For example, a subse-
quent issuance of lesser-voting rights shares does not disenfranchise ex-
isting shareholders, because they retain their full voting rights shares.
Nor are the purchasers of such shares harmed; as in an IPO, they take
the shares knowing that their rights will be less than those of the existing
shareholders.84 Likewise, issuance of lesser-voting rights shares as con-
sideration in a merger or other corporate acquisition should not be objec-
tionable. Shareholders who object to the form of consideration often will
be able to demand their statutory appraisal rights and receive payment in
cash.85
C. Dual Class Stock Dividends
Rule 19c-4 handled stock dividends of disparate voting rights shares in
a variety of ways. It prohibited dividends of super-voting rights shares,
regardless of whether or not the plan included transferability restric-
tions.8 6 On the other hand, the rule presumptively permitted dividends
of shares with voting rights equal to those of the common (including
buyout and thereafter raise new public equity capital, while still retaining effective control through a
dual class capital structure.
83. See generally Proposing Release, supra note 56, at 88,774-75, 88,777-78; Fischel, supra
note 27, at 147; Gilson, supra note 29, at 808-09; Gordon, supra note 28, at 10, 20-23; Ruback,
supra note 28, at 169-71. But see Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights A Response to SEC Rule
19c-4 and to Professor Gilson, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 979 (1989).
84. Proposing Release, supra note 56, at 88,777-78; Dent, supra note 28, at 741.
85. It is possible that a merger could be effected for the sole purpose of disenfranchising existing
shareholders by creating a dual class capital structure. The Commission recognized this possibility
by suggesting that in such cases the presumption of validity would not apply. Adopting Release,
supra note 5, at 89,220 n.94.
86. Id. at 89,221.
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standard stock dividends of additional common shares). Although it is
hard to see why, stock dividends of lesser-voting rights shares raised
some concerns. These types of transactions involve no coercion, but the
SEC feared that insiders might obtain disproportionate voting control via
systematic purchases of the greater-voting rights shares. But so what?
In the absence of coercion, shareholders interested in voting rights can
freely compete for the full voting rights shares. In any event, the SEC
permitted this type of stock dividend subject to case-by-case review for
consistency with the rule's intent.8 7
D. Other Interpretive Issues Raised by Rule 19c-4
When the Commission first proposed rule 19c-4, many commentators
argued that it appeared to cover a variety of corporate actions not involv-
ing the abuses identified by the Commission. In adopting the rule, the
Commission specifically addressed certain of the commentators' breadth
concerns, asserting that the rule was not intended "as a means to prohibit
corporate defensive tactics in general, but merely as a prohibition against
the disenfranchisement of existing shareholders' voting rights."88 Never-
theless, even as modified, rule 19c-4 still would have affected a number of
transactions outside the confines of disparate voting rights plans. Three
areas were of particular concern: state takeover laws, poison pills, and
lock-ups.
Control share acquisition statutes, which many states have adopted,
typically provide that a takeover bidder's shares will be deprived of vot-
ing rights if target company shareholders fail to approve the acquisition
proposal.89 Although the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
87. Id. at 89,220.
88. Id. at 89,225. In addition to those interpretative problems noted in the text, see also Com-
ments of the American Bar Association Task Force on Disparate Voting Rights of the Federal
Regulation of Securities Committee of the Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law sub-
mitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission 23-29 (Aug. 5, 1987) (copy on file with Washing-
ton University Law Quarterly) [hereinafter ABA 1987 Comments]; Comments of the Business
Roundtable 21-32 (Aug. 5, 1987) [hereinafter BRT Comments]. See generally Adopting Release,
supra note 5, at 89,226-28 (summarizing comments and SEC responses).
89. 3 R. WINTER, R. ROSENBAUM, M. STUMPF & L.S. PARKER, SHARK REPELLENTS AND
GOLDEN PARACHUTES: STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES AND POISON PILLS 17 (Supp. 1990) [herein-
after STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES]. If the would-be acquirer so requests, the target company must
call a shareholders' meeting (usually within 50 days after the request) to vote on the acquisition. The
shares owned by the acquirer, officers of the target, and directors who are also employees of the
target may not be counted in that vote. Id. at 18. Ohio, Hawaii, and Missouri have taken a slightly
different approach, under which the shareholders determine whether or not the proposed acquisition
may be made, in contrast to the more usual approach, which simply requires shareholder approval
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an Indiana control share acquisition statute,90 proposed rule 19c-4 ap-
peared to require delisting of a corporation's stock if its shareholders
failed to approve a control acquisition. In such cases, it was argued, the
bidder's voting rights would be "disparately reduced."91
The original version of rule 19c-4 would also have significantly affected
certain forms of shareholder rights plans (a/k/a poison pills). 92 A flip-
over pill effectively gives target shareholders the right to purchase acquir-
ing company shares at a steep discount (usually fifty percent). Because
the pill makes this right available only to target shareholders, the right's
exercise will cause dilution for the bidder's preexisting shareholders and
undesirable balance sheet effects. 93 Conversely, flip-in plans enable target
shareholders to purchase target stock, again at a steep discount. Because
the plan discriminates against the acquirer, as the voting rights are not
exercisable by it, the pill significantly dilutes the acquirer's holdings of
target shares.94 These inherent dilutive effects raised concerns about rule
for voting rights to be accorded to the acquirer's shares. See STATETAKEOVER STATUTES, supra, at
19; Bainbridge, State Takeover and Tender Offer Regulations Post-MITE: The Maryland, Ohio and
Pennsylvania Attempts, 90 DICK. L. REv. 731, 749-50 (1986).
90. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
91. E.g., BRT Comments, supra note 88, at 22-25; see Adopting Release, supra note 5, at
89,225. The Business Roundtable advanced several related arguments against applying rule 19c-4 to
corporate actions taken pursuant to a control share acquisition statute. First, the rule might coerce
shareholders of affected corporations into voting in favor of any control share acquisition proposal,
regardless of its merits, due to the threat of delisting in the event of an unfavorable vote. Second, it
asserted that control share acquisition statutes furthered shareholder rights by protecting them from
the coercive effects of some tender offers. Moreover, it pointed out that bidders could not be said to
have purchased target securities without adequate notice of the possible consequence of doing so
prior to obtaining shareholder approval. Finally, it suggested that because a defeated bidder was free
to resell its shares to any other bidder who obtained shareholder approval, in which event such
shares would again carry full voting rights, the defeated bidder was not deprived of any share of the
control premium, and the deprivation of voting rights was not permanent. BRT Comments, supra
note 88, at 23-25; Testimony of Clifford L. Whitehill on Behalf of the Task Force on Corporate
Responsibility of the Business Roundtable, Hearings Before the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion on Proposed Rule 19c-4 at 12-13 (July 22, 1987) (copy on file with Washington University Law
Quarterly) [hereinafter Whitehill Testimony].
92. For a detailed treatment of poison pills, see 4 R. WINTER, R. ROSENBAUM, M. STUMPF &
L.S. PARKER, SHARK REPELLENTS AND GOLDEN PARACHUTES: STATE TAKEOVER STATUTES
AND POISON PILLS (1988) [hereinafter POISON PILLS].
93. It is possible to eliminate this discrimination by putting antidilution provisions into the
bidder's corporate charter. This would involve the issuance of shares to preexisting acquirer share-
holders in proportion to the shares issued to target shareholders exercising their flip-over rights.
Another possible defense to the flip-over pill involves the acquirer's giving itself a call on any shares
issued in a merger at below-market prices. POISON PILLS, supra note 92, at 571-74 (Supp. 1989).
94. For example, in Grand Metropolitan's acquisition of Pillsbury, Pillsbury's flip-in plan
would have reduced Grand Metropolitan's interest in Pillsbury from 85 to 56 percent. The value of
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19c-4's possible application to pills; the argument being that their dis-
crimination and discount features disparately reduced the voting rights
of the acquirer or its shareholders.95
Finally, the effect proposed rule 19c-4 would have had on stock lock-
ups was unclear. In a stock lock-up, the target company issues common
stock, preferred stock having super-voting rights, or stock options to a
prospective acquirer. They are a common device in friendly corporate
acquisitions because they are designed to assure that a contemplated
business combination will be consummated or, at the least, to assure the
potential acquirer that it will receive some return on its investment in the
target.96 As proposed, the rule seemed to preclude at least the issuance
of preferred stock with multiple voting rights.
As adopted, the rule was revised to make clear that it would have only
a limited impact on these transactions. Corporate actions taken pursuant
to control share acquisition statutes and poison pills were essentially re-
moved from the rule's coverage. 97 In addition, while the rule prohibited
lock-ups effected by means of super-voting shares, it presumptively per-
mitted other types of lock-ups.98 This decision was perfectly defensible.
While each of these transactions raises significant conflict of interest con-
cerns, as each is mainly used to ward off unwanted takeover bids, each is
also subject to judicial scrutiny under existing state law fiduciary duty
principles. 99 As such, further safeguards were unnecessary.
Grand Metropolitan's holdings would have declined by more than $700 million. Grand Metropoli-
tan Public, Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988).
95. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,225-26.
96. See generally Bainbridge, Exclusive Merger Agreements and Lock-Ups in Negotiated Corpo-
rate Acquisitions, 75 MINN. L. REv. 239 (1990).
97. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,225-26. The SEC, however, reserved the right to
continue litigating the constitutionality of state takeover statutes and further warned that takeover
defenses "designed specifically to transfer voting control from existing shareholders to insiders, or a
group favored by insiders," might violate rule 19c-4 even if they were called poison pills. Id.
98. Id. at 89,226. It is not entirely clear why the SEC believed even this prohibition to be
necessary. Suppose an investor purchased a single share of preferred stock with one million votes.
As long as the investor pays a price commensurate with the economic and voting power of that
share, the existing stockholders' voting rights are no more diluted than they would be by the issu-
ance of one million shares of common stock with one vote each. Lock-up shares thus do not neces-
sarily disenfranchise shareholders unless they are issued at an excessively low price. BRT
Comments, supra note 88, at 28-29. One justification for the SEC's position may be the difficulty of
assuring that the price paid by the prospective acquirer is indeed fully compensatory.
99. E.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 281 (2d Cir. 1986)
(lock-up); CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 683 F. Supp. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (poison
pill); Samjens Partners I v. Burlington Indus., 663 F. Supp. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (board decision to
opt selectively out of takeover statute).
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E. Summary
During the first debate over nonvoting common stock, the New York
World published a wonderful poem entitled "On Waiting in Vain for the
New Masses to Denounce Nonvoting Stocks":
Then you who drive the fractious nail,
And you who lay the heavy rail,
And all who bear the dinner pail
And daily punch the clock -
Shall it be said your hearts are stone?
They are your brethren and they groanl
Oh, drop a tear for those who own
Nonvoting corporate stock. 1°°
Ripley evidently believed this evidenced the public's outrage over non-
voting shares. However, I think that the poet was being ironic, mocking
the teapot tempest Ripley and others had created-which raises some
interesting questions about the need for regulation in this area. As
Michael Dooley nicely observes, "poets, at times, and markets, over time,
are more perceptive than lawyers about the need for prohibitory
regulations." 101
The evidence on the merits of dual class stock generally is far from
conclusive. In some circumstances, however, virtually all observers, ex-
cept the hard-core proponents of one-share/one-vote, agree that dual
class stock is unlikely to injure investors; IPOs are the most prominent
example. In other circumstances, substantial agreement exists that dual
class stock will likely injure shareholders; exchange offers being the most
prominent example.
In one sense then, even though one can quibble with many of its provi-
sions, rule 19c-4 was a not unreasonable attempt to address the problem
posed by disparate voting rights plans. In general, the rule permitted
such plans in cases in which a conflict of interest is unlikely, while
prohibiting them in those cases in which it is more likely. Conceding
that rule 19c-4 addressed the right problems, however, does not compel
the conclusion that the SEC was the appropriate regulatory body or that
rule 19c-4 was the right solution. Parts III and IV turn to those
questions.
100. Quoted in W. RIPLEY, supra note 13, at 121.
101. M. DOOLEY, CORPORATION LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 111-159 n.e (1989) (draft
materials quoted by permission; copy on file with author).
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III. SEC RULEMAKING AUTHORITY AND DUAL CLASS STOCK
Conceding the necessity of some form of regulation, the next question
becomes who should regulate disparate voting rights plans. There are at
least four regulators besides the SEC: state legislatures, state securities
(blue sky) commissions, SROs, and Congress.10 2 Because none of them
showed any signs of movement, however, the SEC apparently believed it
had no choice but to act.
As we have seen, state legislatures traditionally have taken a laissez
faire attitude towards corporate capital structure. Proponents of dual
class stock might argue that this is yet more evidence of its appropriate-
ness. 10 3 Its opponents might argue that the lack of state regulation is yet
more evidence of the so-called race to the bottom."° In any event, in the
late 1980s state legislatures seemed unlikely to adopt meaningful limits
on disparate voting rights plans in the near future.
The North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)
has long advocated prohibiting the sale of nonvoting and lesser-voting
stock.'05 Implementing this policy, the blue sky rules of many states
place at least some restrictions on the sale of dual class stock."°6 Blue
sky commissions, nevertheless, were unlikely to provide directly effective
regulation. Among other things, coordination problems might have led
102. An additional, but as yet largely untapped, source of regulation would arise from judicial
interpretations of management fiduciary duties under state corporate law. See supra note 81.
103. Cf. Haddock, Macey, & McChesney, Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender
Offers, 73 VA. L. REV. 701, 730-31 (1987) (states' failure to restrict corporate takeover defenses may
suggest that the latter are efficient).
104. The race to the bottom theory posits that state competition for corporate franchise revenues
results in laws attractive to the corporate managers who make the decision of where to incorporate.
Its classic statement is Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE
LJ. 663 (1974). In recent years, a variant on the theory took on new prominence as the central
argument for federal preemption of state takeover laws. State legislators supposedly are target man-
agement's strongest allies in attempting to deter hostile takeovers. See Romano, The Political Econ-
omy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111 (1987) (states adopted many, if not most, of their
takeover laws at the request of embattled corporate managers). Holders of this view presumably
would argue that states are unlikely to restrict significantly dual class stock even after rule 19c-4's
demise.
105. See North American Securities Administrators Association, Statement of Policy on Non-
voting Stock, NASAA Rep. (CCH) 2,401. NASAA opposed rule 19c-4 on the grounds that the
Commission should adopt a strict one-share/one-vote rule. See Letter from F. Daniel Bell, Presi-
dent of NASAA, to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary of the SEC (July 15, 1987) (copy on file with
Washington University Law Quarterly).
106. See supra text accompanying note 43.
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to a patchwork regulatory system that would significantly complicate se-
curities offerings.
The SROs can regulate dual class stock through their listing standards,
as the NYSE has done for over sixty years. Proponents of federal regula-
tion believed that SRO competition for listings made this a most unlikely
prospect. As management decides on which exchange to list the firm's
securities, so the theory goes, the SROs have an incentive to adopt regu-
lations favored by management.10 7 Supposedly, the trend was towards
freely allowing dual class stock, as evidenced by the NYSE's initial pro-
posal. In any event, while they disagreed on many issues, the major
SROs all testified that they looked to the SEC for leadership in adopting
some form of uniform regulation.108
Congress unquestionably has the power to prohibit or limit disparate
voting rights stock. While there has been a long-standing debate over
whether Congress, as a matter of sound policy, should adopt federal cor-
porate governance standards, 10 9 no one seriously doubts its ability to do
so under the commerce clause.110 On the other hand, during the 1980s,
Congress twice failed to act on proposed federal one-share/one-vote
standards. 1 1
107. E.g., Dent, supra note 28, at 743-44; cf. Coffee, supra note 53, at 1257-58 (SRO race to the
bottom precludes exchange regulation of takeover defenses); Schwartz, Federalism and Corporate
Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 545, 574 (1984) (competition limits SRO ability to regulate corporate
governance). Professor Fischel disputes this application of the race to the bottom thesis. Fischel,
supra note 27, at 127-32; see also DOJ Comments, supra note 28, at 17-18.
108. See Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,218; ag., Statement of Joseph P. Hardiman,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the National Association of Securities Dealers, Hearing
Before the Securities and Exchange Commission (July 22, 1987) (preferring voluntary SRO agree-
ment, but otherwise supporting rule 19c-4); Statement of Arthur Levitt, Jr., Chairman, American
Stock Exchange, Hearings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission (July 22, 1987) (arguing
against rule 19c-4 on grounds that the SEC should impose a uniform one-share/one-vote rule on all
SROs). Recall that, despite SEC efforts, the SROs also had failed to agree voluntarily on a uniform
regulatory system.
109. A voluminous literature is available on the federal incorporation debate, a matter well be-
yond the scope of this Article. For useful compilations of the major arguments, see Symposium,
Current Issues in Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 513 (1984); An In-Depth Analysis of the
Federal and State Roles in Regulating Corporate Management, 31 Bus. LAW. 863 (1976) [hereinafter
Business Lawyer Symposium].
110. Conference Panel Discussion, Federalism Issues in Corporate Governance, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
591, 605-06 (1984) (remarks of Dean Choper).
111. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. § 3 (1987) (mandating one-share/one-vote standard for
exchange and NASDAQ traded voting securities); S. 1314, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2, 131 CoNo.
Rlc. 16,026 (1985) (same); H.R. 2783, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. § 2 (1985) (same); cf. S. 1323, 100th
Cong., Ist Sess. § 17, 133 CONG. REc. 14,618 (1987) (ordering SEC study of dual class stock).
Press reports shortly after the D.C. Circuit's invalidation of rule 19c-4 indicated that House
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The regulatory buck thus stopped with the SEC. To its credit, the
SEC stood up and was counted. But having the will to act is not the sine
qua non for having the right to act under our political system. The ques-
tion thus remained whether the SEC had the authority to adopt rule
19c-4.
A. Agency Rulemaking Power
Administrative agencies obviously have a lawmaking function. They
formulate policy and adopt rules to fill statutory gaps.1 12 Those rules
may legitimately preempt state law. 1 3  However, the agency must
neither act arbitrarily nor exceed its statutory authority. 114 The central
question thus was whether Congress had delegated authority to the SEC
over corporate voting rights. For purposes of judicial review, rule 19c-4
was one of the hard cases: the statute is silent on the relevant issues. In
such cases, a reviewing court will defer to the agency's interpretation of
the statute so long as it constitutes a permissible construction of the stat-
ute. 15 However, while courts accord considerable weight to the agency's
views, they will not defer to an interpretation contrary to the clearly ex-
pressed intent of Congress.' 16
Energy and Commerce Committee Chairman John D. Dingell was considering a legislative response
to the decision. See Sontag, SEC Rule-Making Clout Limited, Nat'l L.J., June 25, 1990, at 3, col.
15. As of this writing, however, it appears unlikely that any new congressional legislation will be
forthcoming in the near future.
112. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44
(1984).
113. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153-54 (1982). It is
true that Commission action designed to create SRO listing standards, such as rule 19c-4, differs
from direct preemption of state corporate law, The former are not enforceable against issuers di-
rectly, but rather merely have "trading market consequences." Letter from Andrew M. Klein to
John S.R. Shad, Chairman, SEC, at 7 (Feb. 19, 1987) (copy on file with Washington University Law
Quarterly). In theory, if an issuer did not want to comply with rule 19c-4, it could simply delist and
trade its stock in the over-the-counter market by means of the pink sheets. In reality, by relegating
noncomplying issuers to the sheets, rule 19c-4 amounted to a de facto preemption of state corporate
law on the subject of voting rights. Securities listed on the pink sheets are substantially less liquid
than those traded on the exchanges or NASDAQ. As such, the threat of delisting effectively forces
issuers to comply. Rule 19c-4 thus amounted to de facto preemption of the capital structure provi-
sions of state corporate law.
114. Fidelity Federal, 458 U.S. at 154; Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Conover, 710
F.2d 878, 882-83 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
115. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965); Bradford Nat'l Clear-
ing Corp. v. SEC, 590 F.2d 1085, 1103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
116. Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d at 408; American Financial Services Ass'n v. FTC,
767 F.2d 957, 968-69 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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Given that congressional intent is the dispositive factor, a problem tan-
gential to the basic thesis of this Article must be briefly addressed;
namely, how to identify that intent. While it is here inappropriate to
rehash the extensive and growing literature on statutory interpreta-
tion, 117 this Article endeavors to apply the Supreme Court's methodol-
ogy in the recent securities law cases. The Court routinely states that the
starting point for its analysis is the statutory language, but the Court
rarely stops there. Instead, the Court also looks to the legislative history
and to judicial and administrative interpretations of the relevant provi-
sions. " ' All of those sources, with appropriate caution, will thus be
treated as grist for the mill.119
B. Regulating Corporate Governance Through the Back Door
The Commission based its authority to adopt rule 19c-4 on its powers
under Exchange Act section 19(c),12° which provides in pertinent part:
The Commission, by rule, may abrogate, add to, and delete from (hereinaf-
ter in this subsection collectively referred to as "amend") the rules of a self-
regulatory organization (other than a registered clearing agency) as the
Commission deems necessary or appropriate to insure the fair administra-
tion of the self-regulatory organization, to conform its rules to requirements
of this chapter and the rules and regulations thereunder applicable to such
organization, or otherwise in furtherance of the purposes of this
117. For useful summaries of current theories of statutory interpretation, see W. ESKRIDGE & P.
FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC
POLICY 569-828 (1988); Ross, Reaganist Realism Comes to Detroit, 1989 U. ILL. L. REV. 399, 404-
16.
118. Some judges and commentators, most notably Justice Scalia, contend that the Court should
start and stop with the plain meaning of the statute. See Ross, supra note 117, at 404-05, When one
looks at what the Court actually does, however, it becomes plain that the Court routinely makes use
of legislative history and other extratextual materials in securities cases. Eg., Pinter v. Dahl, 486
U.S. 622 (1988); Schreiber v. Burlington N. Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222 (1980); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. 185 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975); see generally Wald,
The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the
United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U.L. REv. 277 (1990).
119. Caution would seem particularly appropriate with respect to the use of legislative history
for a variety of reasons, such as the potential for manufacturing it. Ross, supra note 117, at 423-24.
As a rule of thumb, this Article follows Professor Eskridge in assuming that the importance of
legislative history descends in the following order: committee reports; sponsor statements; rejected
proposals; floor and hearing colloquy; views of nonlegislator drafters; legislative inaction; and subse-
quent legislative history. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 636-40 (1990).
120. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,228.
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chapter ....121
While opponents of rule 19c-4 made some technical arguments to the
contrary,122 the Commission concluded that listing standards are SRO
rules and, therefore, it has the power to amend them if its action furthers
the purposes of the Exchange Act. 123 The problem thus narrows to iden-
tifying the relevant purposes of the Act and then asking whether rule
19c-4 in fact furthers any of them. However, before examining the pur-
poses upon which the Commission relied-protecting investors, preserv-
ing fair corporate suffrage, and assuring fair competition between
SROs, 124 it is necessary to discuss briefly one potential source of author-
ity the Commission studiously ignored-the Williams Act.
1. Rule 19c-4 and The Williams Act
Rule 19c-4 was effectively the first substantive federal regulation of
corporate takeover defenses. It essentially precluded those disparate vot-
ing rights plans most likely adopted as a takeover defense, while allowing
companies some flexibility in implementing dual class capital structures
motivated by nondefensive considerations. The Commission recognized,
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1988).
122. The American Bar Association Task Force on New York Stock Exchange Listing Require-
ments argued that "the structure and content of listing agreements between exchanges and issuers
are, except for questions of 'unfair discrimination' among issuers, outside the scope of the Commis-
sion's oversight and regulatory jurisdiction." Comments of the American Bar Association Task
Force on New York Stock Exchange Listing Requirements of the Federal Regulation of Securities
Committee, Section of Corporation, Banking and Business Law submitted to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission at 4 (Dec. 31, 1986) (copy on file with Washington University Law Quarterly)
[hereinafter ABA 1986 Comments]; see generally id. at 3-14; see also ABA 1987 Comments, supra
note 88, at 12-14; cf. Brief of Petitioner at 17-3 1, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C.
Cir. 1990) (arguing that Section 19(c) only authorized the Commission to regulate the securities
industry and thus did not authorize interference with corporate governance listing standards) [here-
inafter BRT Brief]. Still other commentators suggested that SROs would not be obliged to enforce
their voting rights listing standards against issuers. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,230. As
the Commission pointed out, however, the SEC has the power to discipline a SRO for failing to
enforce its own rules. Id.
123. The D.C. Circuit in fact so held. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 408-09. The Commis-
sion did not rely on a claim that rule 19c-4 was, in section 19(c)'s terms, "necessary or appropriate
to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization [or] to conform its rules to re-
quirements of" the Act. Rather, it relied exclusively on a claim that the rule was necessary and
appropriate in the furtherance of sections 6, 11 A, 14A, 15A, and 23 of the Act. Adopting Release,
supra note 5, at 89,230. See also Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 409 ("As no one suggests that
either of the first two purposes justifies Rule 19c-4, the issue before us is the scope of the third, catch-
all provision.").
124. Brief for Respondent at 13-14, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
[hereinafter SEC Brief].
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and undoubtedly intended, that the rule would thereby eliminate an im-
portant antitakeover device. 25 Surprisingly, however, the Commission
did not claim that rule 19c-4 advanced the purposes of the Williams Act,
the 1968 amendments to the Exchange Act regulating tender offers.126
Indeed, commentators had previously suggested that the Williams Act
would justify a rule like 19c-4,127 a suggestion later echoed by the D.C.
Circuit.1 28 As such, the scope of the Commission's authority under the
Williams Act is worth exploring. Once one does so, the Commission's
reticence no longer proves quite so surprising.
The critical provisions are Exchange Act sections 13(e) and 14(e),
which in pertinent part prohibit manipulative practices in connection
with tender offers.129 During the early 1980s, a number of corporate
raiders argued that lock-ups granted to white knights violated this prohi-
bition. This argument met with some initial success, most notably in a
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision holding that lock-up options vio-
lated section 14(e) because they set an artificial ceiling on the price of a
target's stock.1 30 If this interpretation had attained widespread accept-
ance, it would have justified Commission regulation of takeover defenses.
Any defensive tactic precluding the shareholders from deciding whether
or not to accept a takeover bid in a sense sets an artificial cap on the
firm's stock price and thus could be viewed as a manipulative device pro-
hibited by section 14(e).1 31
Ultimately this interpretation of section 14(e) did not prevail. Most
lower courts rejected it.132 In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 1 33
the Supreme Court confirmed the developing lower court majority, hold-
125. See Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,215, 89,217 and 89,221; Proposing Release, supra
note 56, at 88,779. SEC Director of Market Regulation Richard Ketchum observed that rule 19c-4
would eliminate an effective takeover defense. 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1051 (July 8, 1988).
126. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968).
127. E.g., Karmel, Qualitative Standards for "Qualified Securities". SEC Regulation of Voting
Rights, 36 CATH. U.L. REv. 809, 826-27 (1987); Seligman, supra note 15, at 717; see also Coffee,
supra note 53, at 1266-67.
128. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d 406.
129. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e), 78n(e) (1988).
130. Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982
(1982).
131. See Note, Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative under Section 14(e), 84 COLUM. L.
REv. 228 (1984).
132. See, e.g., Data Probe Acquisition Corp. v. Datatab, Inc., 722 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1052 (1984); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 98,616 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
133. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 12 (1985).
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ing that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is an essential element of a
manipulation claim under section 14(e). So it matters not that disparate
voting rights plans make takeovers more difficult. They violate the pro-
hibition of manipulative devices only if adopted without full and fair dis-
closure. 134 Accordingly, despite the D.C. Circuit's passing reference to
the Williams Act, the SEC has no authority under the Williams Act to
regulate substantively dual class transactions. Instead, its authority is
limited to enforcing applicable disclosure obligations. 135
2. Rule 19c-4 and Investor Protection
Protection of investors is indisputably one of the principal purposes of
the Exchange Act. In stating the reasons for the Act's adoption, section
two focuses mainly on protecting investors from various abuses. 136
Moreover, sections 6(b)(5) and 15A(b)(6) expressly require SROs to have
rules that are designed to protect investors and the public interest.1 37
The Commission appeared to claim that rule 19c-4 advanced this pur-
pose in two ways. First, it supposedly protected shareholders from the
risk of disenfranchisement. 38 This argument essentially restates the as-
134. Cf. Steinberg, Tender Offer Regulation: The Need for Reform, 23 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
1, 17-22 (1988) (legitimacy of takeover defenses solely a matter of state law); Note, Down but Not
Out-The Lock-up Option Still has Legal Punch When Properly Used, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1125, 1127-28 (1986) (lock-ups valid under section 14(e) if fully disclosed).
135. It is true that the Williams Act gives the Commission "latitude to regulate nondeceptive
activities as a 'reasonably designed' means of preventing manipulative acts .... " Schreiber, 472 U.S.
at 11 n. 11. It is difficult to see, however, what manipulative acts would be prevented by a prohibition
of dual class stock. Cf. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 504 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989) (dictum to the effect that the Williams Act does not preempt
state laws permitting dual class stock).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1988).
137. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(5), 78o-3(b)(6) (1988). The D.C. Circuit took a narrow view of the
Commission's authority under these sections. Otherwise, the SEC could use its regulatory powers to
"circumvent the legislative process that is virtually the sole protection for state interests." The
broad terms they use therefore must be limited to areas contemplated by Congress. As such, they do
not provide independent support for rule 19c-4. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413.
138. SEC Brief, supra note 124, at 39-40; Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,232. The Com-
mission might have made broader investor protection claims. For example, it might have claimed
that federal regulation of matters of corporate governance was essential to protect shareholders. If
made, this claim should have been rejected in light of the Exchange Act's legislative history. See
infra note 148 and accompanying text. The SEC might also have suggested that the injury caused by
dual class stock recapitalizations justified the rule. However, given the mixed empirical evidence for
those claims, premising the rule's validity on those grounds might have led a court to strike it down
as not based on substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988) (requiring agency action to be
supported by substantial evidence).
The delegation doctrine may also have constrained the SEC from making more sweeping investor
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sertion that the Act was intended to assure fair corporate suffrage and is
therefore considered in the next section.
In litigation over the validity of rule 19c-4, the Commission also ar-
gued that the Business Roundtable's very challenge to the rule implicated
investor protection concerns. The SEC has frequently used its section
19(b) oversight powers to review SRO listing standards, many of which
affect matters of corporate governance. 139 The Business Roundtable,
however, argued that the SEC simply has no power with respect to cor-
porate governance listing standards under section 19(b) or 19(c).t4 The
Commission contended that accepting the Roundtable's position would
undermine investor protection by depriving the Commission of oversight
authority under Section 19(b) in this area. Moreover, the SEC argued
that the Roundtable's position would effectively preclude the SROs from
addressing corporate governance issues in their listing standards. 141
Section 19(b) requires an SRO to file proposed rules or changes to ex-
isting rules with the SEC. 42 The Commission must thereupon deter-
mine whether the proposal is consistent with the requirements of the Act.
If so, the proposal must be approved; if not, it must be rejected. In con-
trast, before the Commission may affirmatively impose SRO rules, sec-
tion 19(c) requires that the proposal be necessary or appropriate to
further the purposes of the Act.
The plain language of the statute thus suggests a critical distinction
between the Commission's powers under sections 19(b) and 19(c). 143 As
protection claims. While the delegation doctrine has been a dead letter for more than 50 years, the
Supreme Court has sometimes adopted a narrow construction of the statute to avoid delegation
doctrine problems, with the result that the challenged regulations were held invalid as not author-
ized by the pertinent statute. E.g., National Cable Television Ass'n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336
(1974); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); see Dent, supra note 28, at 736; Schoenbrod, The
Delegation Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1223, 1233 (1985).
Investor protection is just the sort of amorphous standard that might have encouraged such an
approach. Indeed, the Business Roundtable's argument that rule 19c-4 violated the delegation doc-
trine, BRT Brief, supra note 122, at 46-49, may have contributed to the D.C. Circuit's decision.
139. Examples are cited in SEC Brief, supra note 124, at 32 n.45.
140. See BRT Brief, supra note 122, at 23-25.
141. SEC Brief, supra note 124, at 31-33.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b)(2) (1988).
143. Professor Karmel asserts that "[w]here Congress has presumed regulatory authority to ex-
ist at the SRO level, subject to SEC oversight, it would be anomalous for the SEC not to be able to
act to maintain the viability of prior regulatory requirements." Karmel, supra note 126, at 829.
Perhaps so, but then why did Congress set different standards for SEC action under the two sec-
tions?
The conference and committee reports on the 1975 legislation creating sections 19(b) and 19(c)
are silent on the question of whether the two standards are substantively different. The Business
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nothing in the Exchange Act prohibits an SRO from regulating internal
corporate affairs and management through its listing standards, propos-
als to do so are not inconsistent with the Act. The SROs could therefore
continue to adopt corporate governance listing standards, and the SEC
could continue to review them under section 19(b). Of course, under the
statutory standard, such proposals must be approved, but that is true of
all SRO proposals that are consistent with the Act. As such, rule 19c-4
could be invalidated without affecting the SEC's oversight powers under
section 19(b).
Which interpretation the D.C. Circuit adopted is not entirely clear.
On the one hand, the court reaffirmed "that the 'rules of a self-regulatory
organization' required to be vetted by the Commission under § 19(b) are
all-encompassing .... ,1 Moreover, the court recognized that SROs
have the right to adopt listing standards affecting corporate governance
matters. 145 However, it then appeared to suggest that the SEC had little,
if any, oversight authority with respect to such rules:
Congress appears to have contemplated exchanges' taking (1) some meas-
ures that regulate members with delegated governmental authority and that
are required to be, at a minimum, related to the purposes of the Act, and (2)
others, that do not regulate members and do not rely on government regu-
latory authority, for which there is no such requirement. As we read the
Act, both categories are subject to Commission review under § 19(b) and to
amendment under § 19(c), but for some rules in the second category-
those which do not regulate members and are not related to the purposes of
the Act-the Commission's § 19 powers will be quite limited. 146
But limited how? Perhaps the court meant nothing more than the analy-
sis suggested above; namely, that the Commission must review SRO cor-
porate governance standards, but also must routinely approve them
absent some clear conflict with the Exchange Act. Or perhaps not.
The differences between the Roundtable's, the court's, and my inter-
Roundtable contended that Congress in fact viewed the two sections as having different intent, with
the Commission's powers under section 19(c) being more intrusive and thus also more limited. It
pointed out that section 19(c) imposes much more rigorous procedural requirements. Reply Brief
for Petitioner at 16 n.25, Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (No. 88-1651)
[hereinafter BRT Reply Brief]. It also lointed out that in drafting the 1975 amendments creating
the present statutory scheme, the House suggested that some SRO regulatory action would lie
outside the scope of the SEC's powers. BRT Brief, supra note 122, at 24 (citing H.R. REP. No. 123,
94th Cong., Ist Sess. 62-63 (1975)).
144. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410.
145. Id. at 414.
146. Id.
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pretation are important mainly because they may affect the SROs' ability
to develop collectively a uniform standard. SRO actions are only exempt
from the antitrust laws when they are carried out under SEC over-
sight.14 7 Because the SEC would retain its section 19(b) oversight au-
thority under my analysis, collective action by the SROs would remain
permissible. If, however, the court meant to limit significantly the SEC's
section 19(b) oversight powers with respect to corporate governance list-
ing standards, joint SRO action becomes subject to challenge under the
antitrust standards.
3. Rule 19c-4 and Fair Corporate Suffrage
The Commission's central, and strongest, argument was that the Ex-
change Act was intended to assure "fair corporate suffrage." In other
words, the Act purportedly assumes and was intended to ensure that
shareholders would have meaningful voting rights. Rule 19c-4 suppos-
edly advances this goal "by preventing the disenfranchisement of existing
shareholders through transactions that are not fully subject to market
discipline."' 48
a. The SEC's Authority Over Corporate Governance
When present section 19(c) was adopted, some commentators sug-
gested that it effectively gave the SEC power to adopt a federal law of
corporations by mandating SRO listing standards. Indeed, some observ-
ers saw rule 19c-4 as the first step towards broad federal regulation of
corporate governance.' 49 Although the Commission disclaimed any such
intent, it nevertheless argued that section 19(c) empowers it to amend all
147. Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, 422 U.S. 659, 684-85 (1975).
148. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,231. The drafters of the Exchange Act believed the
legislation was necessary precisely because they also believed market discipline was not an effective
check on the abuses they were trying to prevent. Eg., H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess, 3
(1934). Even assuming that the drafters of the Exchange Act meant to prevent shareholder disen-
franchisement when they referred to fair corporate suffrage, the SEC's decision to permit disen-
franchising transactions that are subject to market discipline seems inconsistent with the Act's
overarching intent.
149. Eg., Whitehill Testimony, supra note 91, at 8-10. Calls for a federal corporate law are not
new. Madison, for example, proposed that the Constitution give the federal government power to
grant charters of incorporation, which presumably would have led to the development of a detailed
body of federal statutory and common law. Boyer, Federalism and Corporation Law: Drawing the
Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1041 (1986); Schwartz, supra note 107, at
547. More to the point, just 20 years prior to the adoption of the Exchange Act, the Pujo Committee
suggested that "much-needed reforms in the organization and methods of our corporations" could
be affected through exchange listing standards. H.R. REP. No. 1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 114-15
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SRO rules, including corporate governance listing standards, subject
only to the limitation that the rule further one of the purposes of the
Act. 5 The broader the reading one gives to those purposes, the broader
will be the Commission's authority to displace state law. Indeed, the
D.C. Circuit held that the Commission's reading of the Exchange Act's
purposes was broad enough to justify establishing a comprehensive fed-
eral corporate law under section 19(c).15 1 Despite the SEC's denials, de-
fining the limits on its general powers with respect to matters of
corporate governance thus is an appropriate starting point for analysis.
The predecessor to present section 19(c) authorized the SEC to amend
exchange rules in twelve specific areas, including the listing or striking
from listing of any security, with a final catch-all clause covering "similar
matters." '52 When the current, facially more inclusive language was
adopted, Congress indeed intended to broaden substantially the Commis-
sion's authority over SRO rules. As the Senate Banking, Housing and
Urban Affairs Committee explained, the changes gave the Commission
plenary "power to change the rules of a self-regulatory organization in
any respect, not just with respect to [the previously] enumerated ar-
eas." '1 53 The Commission heavily relied upon this language to support its
claim that section 19(c) authorizes it to mandate SRO listing standards
affecting shareholder voting rights. 154
The 1975 legislative history is silent as to whether the Commission's
powers are so broad as to encompass matters of corporate governance.
Shortly after the 1975 amendments were adopted, some commentators
suggested that section 19(c) effectively authorized the SEC to promulgate
a federal corporate law by appropriate amendments to SRO listing stan-
dards.'55 On the other hand, a number of other commentators argued
that the SEC's powers under section 19(c) did not extend to corporate
(1913). For overviews of the federal incorporation debate during the latter part of the 1800s and
early 1900s, see Boyer, supra, at 1048-50; Loomis & Rubman, supra note 15, at 158-61.
150. SEC Brief, supra note 124, at 17-19.
151. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412.
152. Securities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 19(b), 48 Stat. 881, 881-82 (1934).
153. S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., Ist Sess. 131 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 1790.
154. SEC Brief, supra note 124, at 15-24.
155. E.g., Business Lawyer Symposium, supra note 109, at 1095-96 (comments of Lee Pickard);
see also Letter from Andrew M. Klein to John S.R. Shad, Chairman, SEC (Feb. 19, 1987) (copy on
file with Washington University Law Quarterly) (Klein was the SEC Director of Market Regulation
in 1975).
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governance issues.156 As post-enactment statements by nonlegislators,
however, neither set of comments is very compelling.
The argument that the 1975 amendments did not give the SEC author-
ity over corporate governance listing standards, nevertheless, receives
some support from the historical context. As the Business Roundtable
pointed out, 157 the 1975 legislation was triggered by the so-called "back
office" crisis of the late 1960s and a simultaneous wave of broker-dealer
financial scandals and failures. 158 The crisis led to a study by the Senate
Securities Subcommittee, which identified various flaws in the self-regu-
latory system.159 Corporate governance reform through SEC exercise of
its 19(c) powers simply was not on Congress' mind in 1975. Congress
was concerned with modernizing the securities industry to account for
recent technological developments and with preventing a recurrence of
the back office crisis by strengthening the SEC's regulatory powers with
respect to the SROs and their member broker-dealers. 16° As such, the
1975 amendments to section 19 provide little affirmative support to rule
19c-4.
Regardless of just how far Congress broadened the SEC's powers in
1975, Congress clearly did not intend for the legislation to narrow the
SEC's existing authority over SROs. The question therefore arises as to
whether the powers delegated to the Commission in 1934 included au-
thority over corporate governance matters. If so, that power certainly
survived the 1975 amendments. The answer, however, is that Congress
gave no such authority.
Both the text of the Exchange Act and its historical context lend sup-
port to this conclusion. The Exchange Act on its face says nothing about
156. See Business Lawyer Symposium, supra note 109, at 1096 (comments of Stephen Paradise,
Senate Banking Committee counsel in 1975); id. at 1111 (comments of former SEC Chairman Wil-
Ham Cary); See also BRT Brief, supra note 122, at 30-31 & n.42 (citing statements from 1977 con-
gressional hearings); Testimony of A.A. Sommer on Behalf of Alliance for Corporate Growth,
Hearings Before the Securities and Exchange Commission 3 (Dec. 17, 1986) (copy on file with Wash.
ington University Law Quarterly) (Sommer was an SEC Commissioner in 1975).
157. BRT Comments, supra note 88, at 10-11.
158. H.R. REP. No. 1519, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-13 (1972). The back office crisis developed out
of a substantial increase in trading volume during the late 1960s. Many firms were unable to handle
the resulting paperwork flow, lost records, and ultimately went out of business. See generally J.
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 450-66 (1982).
159. Securities Industry Study, Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. (1973).
160. S. REP. No. 75, supra note 153, at 2, 22-38, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 180-81, 200-16.
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regulation of corporate governance. Instead, the Act focuses primarily
on securities trading and securities pricing. Thus, virtually all of its pro-
visions address such matters as the production and distribution of infor-
mation about issuers and their securities, the flow of funds in the market,
and the market's basic structure. 161 This approach resulted from Con-
gress' interpretation of the Great Crash and the subsequent Depression.
Rightly or wrongly, many people believed that excessive stock market
speculation and the collapse of the stock market had caused the Great
Depression. The drafters of the Exchange Act were thus primarily con-
cerned with preventing a recurrence of the speculative excesses they be-
lieved had caused the market's collapse. 162
Opponents of the legislation, however, quickly claimed that it went far
beyond its stated purposes. According to Richard Whitney, president of
the NYSE and a leading opponent of the bill, a number of provisions,
including the predecessor to section 19(c), collectively gave the Commis-
sion "powers ... so extensive that they might be used to control the
management of all listed companies,"' 1 63 a charge repeated by congres-
sional opponents of the bill.'"1
The bill's supporters strenuously denied that they intended to regulate
corporate management. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee
went to the length of adding a proposed section 13(d) to the bill, which
provided: "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the
Commission to interfere with the management of the affairs of an is-
161. The], The Original Conception of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 385, 391-92 (1990).
162. See Securities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 2, 48 Stat. 881, 881-82 (1934); S. REP.
No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934) (need to control excessive stock market speculation that had
"brought in its train social and economic evils which have affected the security and prosperity of the
entire country."); 78 CONG. REc. 7921-22 (1934) (Rep. Mapes) (the Act had two objectives: to
prevent excessive speculation and to provide a fair and honest market for securities transactions); see
also Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 207 (6th Cir. 1961).
163. Letter from Richard Whitney to all NYSE members (Feb. 14, 1934), reprinted in 78 CONG.
REc. 2827-28 (1934). See also Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearings Before the House Interstate
and Foreign Commerce Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 230-33 (1934) [hereinafter House Hearings].
Whitney's role in leading the opposition to the Exchange Act, along with his subsequent misadven-
tures, is recounted in J. BROOKS, ONCE IN GOLCONDA (1969).
164. E.g., 78 CONG. REc. 8271 (1934) (Sen. Steiwer); id. at 8012 (Rep. McGugin); id. at 7937
(Rep. Bakewell); id. at 7710 (Rep. Britten); id. at 7691-92 (Rep. Crowther); id. at 7690 (Rep.
Cooper). Others suggested that while early drafts of the legislation had perhaps justifiably raised
such concerns, they believed the legislation had been redrafted so as to eliminate any legitimate fears
on this score. Eg., 78 CONG. REc. 7863 (1934) (Rep. Wolverton); id. at 7716-17 (Rep. Ford); id. at
7713 (Rep. Wadsworth).
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suer." 165 The conference committee deleted the provision because it was
seen "as unnecessary, since it is not believed that the bill is open to mis-
construction in this respect." 16 6 The debates contain numerous similar
denials, some of the most emphatic coming from House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Committee Chairman Sam Rayburn.167 For present
purposes, the most interesting of these denials is Representative Mapes'
observation that nothing in section 19(c)'s predecessor authorized the
Commission to "control in any way any corporations except stock
exchanges."168
This debate admittedly need not be read as going to preemption of
state corporate law. As the D.C. Circuit observed, interference with
management might mean a variety of things. 169 While the Business
Roundtable and the D.C. Circuit believed Congress intended to avoid
corporate governance regulation,1 70 proponents of a broad SEC power
could plausibly argue that the New Deal Congress was really denying
charges of creeping socialism. Opposition to New Deal legislation typi-
cally included charges of radicalism and collectivism. 7' The Exchange
Act was no different. Even with this gloss, however, the legislative his-
tory still suggests that Congress focused mainly on regulating the securi-
ties industry, not listed companies. Moreover, the New Deal Congresses
later rejected explicit proposals for establishing a federal law of
corporations.
During the New Deal era a number of efforts were made to grant the
SEC authority over corporate governance. While the Exchange Act was
being drafted, the Roosevelt administration considered developing a
comprehensive federal corporation law. 172 The Senate Banking and Cur-
165. S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 13(d) (1934). While proposed section 13(d) specifically re-
sponded to objections to the issuer reporting provisions of the bill, see S. REP. No. 792, supra note
162, at 10, the provision on its face applied to the entire bill.
166. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1934).
167. E.g., 78 CONG. REc. 7693-98, 8093 (1934) (Rep. Rayburn).
168. 78 CONG. REc. 8088 (1934) (Rep. Mapes). The context of this comment was a debate over
the Commission's powers with respect to the internal operations of exchange members, but Mapes'
comments appear to have a more global application. Richard Whitney also seemingly recognized
that the provision which became section 19(c) applied mainly to regulation of the exchanges and
their member broker-dealers. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 73d Cong, 1st Sess. 6638 (1934) [hereinafter Pecora Hearings].
169. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411-12.
170. Id.
171. See P. CONKIrN, THE NEW DEAL 34 (1967).
172. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 158, at 87.
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rency Committee's report on stock exchange practices also suggested
that the cure for the nation's "corporate ailments ... may lie in a na-
tional incorporation act." '173 Richard Whitney made the same suggestion
in an unsuccessful effort to shift the focus of regulation from the ex-
changes to listed issuers.174 In the late 1930s, then SEC Chairman Wil-
liam 0. Douglas orchestrated yet another effort to replace state corporate
law with a set of federal rules administered by the SEC.'75 In this, he
was anticipated and assisted by Senators Borah and O'Mahoney who in-
troduced a series of bills designed to regulate corporate internal affairs.176
None of these proposals ever came to fruition. Legislative inaction is
inherently ambiguous, even when that inaction takes the form of re-
jecting a specific proposal. 17  "All that can be stated with certainty is
that Congress chose not to act."'' 78 However, while the evidence admit-
tedly is not conclusive, there is considerable reason to believe that Con-
gress did not intend for the SEC's power over listing standards to extend
to matters of corporate governance. Granted Congress did not expressly
state any such limitation, but Congress apparently did not believe it was
necessary to do so. Surely the Congress that repeatedly denied any intent
to regiment corporate management, and later repeatedly rejected propos-
als to federalize corporate law, did not intend to sneak those powers back
into the bill through the back door provided by section 19(c) and its
173. S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 391 (1934).
174. Pecora Hearings, supra note 168, at 6583.
175. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 158, at 156.
176. O'Mahoney, Federal Charters to Save Free Enterprise, 1949 Wis. L. REv. 407. See gener-
ally Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regulation, 49 HARv. L. REV. 396 (1936); Boyer,
supra note 148, at 1052-54; Brown, Federal Legislation: The Federal Corporation Licensing Bill:
Corporate Regulation, 27 GEO. L.J. 1092 (1939); Loomis & Rubman, supra note 15, at 161-64;
Reuschlein, Federalization-Design for Corporate Reform in a National Economy, 91 U. PA. L. REv.
91(1942).
Proposals for a federal corporation statute did not stop when the New Deal ended. Eg., Protec-
tion of Shareholders' Rights Act of 1980. Hearing Before the Subcomnt on Securities of the Sen.
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); The Role of the Share-
holder in the Corporate World: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Citizens and Shareholders Rights
and Remedies of the Sen. Comm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). In the 1970s, the
Commission considered imposing a variety of corporate governance reforms, including various pro-
posed new proxy rules. Exchange Act Release No. 14970 (July 18, 1978). After vigorous objections
that the Commission had exceeded its statutory authority, the rules were substantially modified
before adoption. Exchange Act Release No. 15384 (Dec. 6, 1978). See generally J. SELIGMAN,
supra note 157, at 534-50; Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus.
LAW. 173 (1981).
177. See R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 160 (1975).
178. Boyer, supra note 149, at 1053.
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predecessors. 179 It is thus not surprising that fifty years later, during the
SEC rulemaking proceedings on rule 19c-4, it took "surviving members"
of the SEC's 1930s "staff somewhat askance-even to be asked whether
[the Commission] has the capacity to pronounce affirmative governance
standards." 180
b. The SEC's Authority Over Corporate Voting Rights
While the Commission admits that it does not have "unlimited author-
ity to amend SRO rules in areas of 'corporate governance,'" it claims
that its authority extends to any such areas in which action would fur-
ther a specific purpose of the Act.18' In particular, the Commission con-
tends that when sections 14 and 19 are read against the backdrop of the
nonvoting common stock controversy of the 1920s, a congressional in-
tent to prevent shareholder disenfranchisement emerges.1 82 In effect,
Congress supposedly adopted the NYSE policy on corporate voting
rights as one of the Exchange Act's purposes and gave the SEC authority
to prevent subsequent erosion of the policy. The absence of express limi-
tations on the Commission's authority over listing standards lends some
support to this reading. 83 However, in order for it to prevail, the Com-
mission must establish that Congress was both aware of the NYSE's pol-
icy and consciously intended to effectuate it by delegating authority to
the agency. 184
Admittedly, Congress had evidence before it as to the NYSE's policy.
179. The D.C. Circuit "read the Act as reflecting a clear congressional determination not to
make any such broad delegation of power to the Commission. If the Commission's one share/one
vote rule is to survive, then, some kind of firebreak is needed to separate it from corporate govern-
ance as a whole." The court was unable to find any such firebreak and therefore invalidated the rule.
Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413. See also BRT Reply Brief, supra note 143, at 7-9.
180. Proposing Release, supra note 56, at 88,786 (Fleischman, C., concurring) (his comment is
based on personal discussions with those surviving members). New Deal era commentators also
recognized that the Exchange Act did not regulate corporate governance. E.g., Brown, supra note
176, at 1098.
181. SEC Brief, supra note 124, at 13 (emphasis in original).
182. See id. at 25-26.
183. As the Commission put it, "[lt is most unlikely that Congress, in giving the Commission
authority to amend exchange listing rules, intended to deprive the Commission of authority over the
one listing rule that, in view of the public uproar in the 1920s, was almost certainly the most widely-
known by members of Congress." Id. at 29-30.
184. The SEC's claim of implied incorporation is similar to the assertion that congressional si-
lence in the face of an administrative practice or regulation should be interpreted as constituting
congressional approval of the practice or regulation. The D.C. Circuit has applied the test set forth
in the text to measure the relevance of congressional silence in the latter context. E.g., Inner City
Broadcasting Corp. v. Sanders, 733 F.2d 154, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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However, the references to nonvoting stock occur only in the hearings
and these are scanty indeed." 5 As Pecora's history of the Senate hear-
ings treats in detail many of the practices he saw as abusive, it is also
noteworthy that it includes no references to the NYSE's policy.'8 6
Lastly, none of the committee reports even mention the issue.187 One
should therefore hesitate before presuming widespread congressional
awareness and concern about dual class stock.'88
The legislative history also raises doubts as to whether Congress in-
tended to incorporate the NYSE's policy into the Exchange Act. The
Senate Banking and Currency Committee's report on the results of the
Pecora Hearings contains the most detailed committee discussion of ex-
change listing standards. The Committee identified the major flaw in this
area as the exchange's laxity in investigating listing applications from
dubious companies. Moreover, in explaining the need for regulation of
listing requirements, the Committee focused solely on the need for peri-
odic corporate disclosures from issuers. 189 The Committee simply did
not address regulation of exchange listing standards affecting such mat-
ters as corporate voting rights.
The Commission admitted that Congress did not directly regulate
shareholder voting rights, but argued that it did not need to do so in light
of the NYSE's policy against nonvoting common stock. As the NYSE
was the principal secondary trading market, Congress could assume that
shareholders would have effective voting rights. The SEC thus read Con-
gress' silence on dual class stock as reflecting an implicit assumption that
185. Out of the thousands of pages of House and Senate hearings, the only reference to the
NYSE policy that I found is the testimony of Frank Altschul, Chairman of the NYSE Committee on
Stock List. Pecora Hearings, supra note 168, at 6677-80. In colloquy with Altschul, Ferdinand
Pecora referred to nonvoting common stock as an "evil." Id. at 6679. He had earlier in the hearings
also raised questions as to the use of nonvoting preferred stock. Id. at 6661-62. Pecora's comments
are entitled to some weight in light of the significant role he played in creating the federal securities
laws, SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 69 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980),
but not every matter Pecora identified as an evil was subjected to federal regulation.
186. F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH (1939).
187. The Senate Banking Committee's report on the Pecora Hearings contains some widely scat-
tered discussion of voting rights issues, but only in the context of condemning the abuses of invest-
ment trusts and holding company structures prevalent at the time. See S. REP. No. 1455, supra note
173, at 333-91.
188. BRT Reply Brief, supra note 143, at 4-5 (citing SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 121 (1978))
(one should be "extremely hesitant to presume congressional awareness of the Commission's con-
struction based only upon a few isolated statements in the thousands of pages of legislative
documents.").
189. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 173, at 70-73.
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shareholders would not be disenfranchised and an implicit intent to pre-
vent disenfranchisement.190
The Commission's interpretation of the legislative history is flawed on
several grounds. If true, it suggests only that the SEC might have au-
thority to force the NYSE to maintain its 1934 policy intact, or to force
other SROs to adopt the NYSE's 1934 policy, neither of which is what
rule 19c-4 does. 191 Moreover, the argument is inconsistent with the atti-
tudes of the Act's drafters towards exchange regulation. If Congress was
concerned with dual class stock, it undoubtedly would have thought the
mere use of SRO rules would not achieve the desired result. In the
House debates, for example, Chairman Rayburn recognized that many
exchanges did not have the same bargaining power vis-a-vis issuers as the
NYSE. He further observed that exchange regulation could "only go so
far before selfish managements" refused to comply. 192 While he made
these observations in the context of disclosure obligations, they are con-
sistent with the then prevailing view that self-regulation by the exchanges
was inadequate to resolve the economic problems Congress had identi-
fied. 193 If Congress had wanted to graft the NYSE's nonvoting common
stock policy onto the Act, it would have said so explicitly. Congress'
inaction, therefore, should be read as leaving voting rights in the hands of
the states and the exchanges, especially when considered in light of the
repeated congressional rejections of proposals to federalize corporate
law. In assessing Congress' intentions one also should consider what it
was actually told about dual class stock. Recall that Ripley and others
had announced the demise of nonvoting common stock as early as 1926.
Frank Altschul, the Chairman of the NYSE's Committee on Stock List,
repeated that claim before Congress, stating that "the period of the crea-
tion of nonvoting common stocks came to an end" with the NYSE's ac-
tion in 1926.194 As far as Congress knew in 1934, nonvoting stock was a
190. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,231. The Business Roundtable argued that the 1964
amendments to section 14 also undercut the SEC's argument. Those amendments were intended to
extend the proxy rules to the OTC market. At that time, issuers trading in the OTC market were
subject to no listing standards on dual class stock. Yet Congress failed to make any effort to estab-
lish policies comparable to that of the NYSE for OTC securities. See BRT Comments, supra note
88, at 12-15.
191. Whitehill Testimony, supra note 91, at 4.
192. 78 CONG. REc. 7698 (1934).
193. E.g., S. REP. No. 792, supra note 162, at 4-5.
194. Pecora Hearings, supra note 168, at 6677. Altschul plainly overstated the case; dual class
and nonvoting stock did not die in 1926. Moreover, the NYSE did not formalize its policy until
1940. Finally, the NYSE continued thereafter to list some dual class shares.
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dead issue. On the other hand, Altschul's testimony made clear that the
NYSE continued to list voting trust certificates. 95 As Pecora pointed
out, they were a device used to deprive stockholders of an effective voice
in management-"an evil comparable to that of nonvoting stock, except
that the evil is limited as to time."' 96 While Altschul tried to distinguish
between nonvoting stock and voting trusts,197 it is striking that Congress
did not attempt to regulate the latter. If Congress had been concerned
with protecting the substance of shareholder voting rights, surely it
would have struck at those perceived abuses permitted by the NYSE's
policy. Again, the more logical reading of Congress' silence on voting
rights thus is that it simply was not taking a position on the validity of
nonvoting and dual class stock.' 98
This interpretation receives additional support from the legislative his-
tory of section 14(a). The Commission placed great weight on a House
Committee Report statement that "[flair corporate suffrage is an impor-
tant right that should attach to every equity security bought on a public
exchange."' 9 9 The same report also stated: "Inasmuch as only the ex-
changes make it possible for securities to be widely distributed among the
investing public, it follows as a corollary that the use of the exchanges
should involve a corresponding duty of according shareholders fair suf-
frage." 2" While it is indisputable that Congress intended for section
14(a) to give the SEC broad powers over corporate proxy solicitations, it
is reasonable to believe that Congress had in mind an entirely different
set of issues than those raised by nonvoting stock when it referred to fair
corporate suffrage.
The legislative history of section 14(a) is relatively sparse, in large part
195. Id. at 6679.
196. Id. Voting trusts were then, as now, usually limited by statute to a set period of time. 2
RMBCA Ann., supra note 41, at 688-89.
197. Pecora Hearings, supra note 168, at 6679-81.
198. As the D.C. Circuit observed, nothing in the legislative history "comes near to saying, 'The
purposes of this act, although they generally will not involve the Commission in corporate govern-
ance, do include preservation of the one share/one vote principle.' And even [if any did] we doubt
that such a statement in the legislative history could support a special and anomalous exception to
the Act's otherwise intelligible conceptual line excluding the Commission from corporate govern-
ance." Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413. Cf. Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods
Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 504 (7th Cir. 1989) (dictum to the effect that the proxy rules do not preempt
state laws permitting dual class stock).
199. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 148, at 13, quoted in Adopting Release, supra note 5, at
89,231.
200. Id. at 14, quoted in Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,231.
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because the controversy over federal proxy regulation was resolved early
in the legislative process. 20 1 As originally introduced, the proxy provi-
sion mandated substantial disclosures and gave the SEC authority to
adopt additional disclosure requirements.2 "2 The proposal met with sub-
stantial criticism. For example, AT&T pointed out that the bill required
the proxy statement to include a list of all shareholders being solicited,
which would force AT&T to prepare three large volumes, at a total cost
of $950,000, every time proxies were solicited.20 3
Congress redrafted section 14(a) in response to these criticisms. In
doing so, Congress did what it often does when it has a tough problem to
solve: it told somebody else to solve it. In effect, the Act simply made it
unlawful to solicit proxies "in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors." 2" Congress clearly
intended to give the SEC sweeping power over corporate proxy solicita-
tions.20 5 Once again, we therefore face a broad grant of authority and
the question of whether the historical context suggests a congressional
intent to narrow the facially sweeping statutory language. 20 6
201. Ryan, Rule 14a-8, Institutional Shareholder Proposals, and Corporate Democracy, 23 GA.
L. REv. 97, 132 (1988).
202. H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 13(a) (1934).
203. House Hearings, supra note 163, at 527-29. For like criticisms, see id. at 917 (statement of
National Automobile Chamber of Commerce); Pecora Hearings, supra note 168, at 6673 (testimony
of Richard Whitney).
204. Securities Exchange Act, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 14(a), 48 Stat. 881, 895 (1934). As origi-
nally adopted, section 14(a) applied only to securities registered on a national securities exchange.
In 1964, it was amended to apply to OTC issuers as well. Otherwise, it remains largely intact.
205. Medical Comm. for Human Rights v. SEC, 432 F.2d 659, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1970), vacated as
moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972). The debates suggest that key congressmen expected some limitations on
the exercise of the Commission's powers under section 14(a). Representative Snell recalled the ex-
pense and "real trouble" that the original draft might have caused and asked how the new draft
differed. In responding, Representative Mapes noted that the final language clothed the Commission
"with very broad discretionary powers," but did "not bind the Commission to any specific form of
control." 78 CONG. REc. 7923 (1934). Representative Snell asked whether this meant the Commis-
sion could adopt rules imposing the same sort of requirements that had led to the section's redraft-
ing. Mapes said that "if we assume the Commission is going to be unreasonable, I presume that is
true." Id. Chairman Rayburn thereupon intervened to point out that the Commission's interpreta-
tion of its powers, and judicial review of its exercise of those powers, would certainly take the deci-
sion to revise the bill into account. Id. at 7924.
206. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984),
the Supreme Court suggested that where Congress has "left a gap for the agency to fill," id. at 843-
44, as it has done here, the agency's regulations will be "given controlling weight unless they are
arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Id. at 844. The D.C. Circuit ques-
tioned whether Chevron even applied to the rule 19c-4 litigation, since the Business Roundtable's
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In implementing section 14(a), the SEC has affected corporate govern-
ance to a greater extent than under any other provision of the Exchange
Act: rule 14a-4 restricts management's use of discretionary power to cast
votes obtained by a proxy solicitation;20 7 rule 14a-7 requires management
cooperation in transmitting an insurgent's proxy materials to sharehold-
ers;208 and rule 14a-8 requires management to include qualified share-
holder proposals in the corporation's proxy statement at the firm's
expense.2"9 Although some opponents of the legislation anticipated these
sorts of intrusions into internal corporate affairs,2 10 section 14(a) actually
has a rather narrow impact on corporate governance. Most of the SEC's
proxy rules relate to disclosure. Full disclosure of matters to come
before a shareholder meeting, for example, was the original justification
for the shareholder proposal rule.2 ' While the Commission's authority
under section 14(a) is not limited to disclosure issues, its other proxy
challenge "might be characterized as involving a limit on the SEC's jurisdiction" as to which defer-
ence may be inappropriate. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 408. Although the D.C. Circuit none-
theless assumed that the SEC was entitled to deference, it held that the rule was contrary to the
clearly expressed will of Congress and thus was invalid even under Chevron. Id.
207. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4 (1990).
208. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-7 (1990).
209. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1990).
210. Senator Gore, for example, inserted into the record of the debates a New York Times news
article quoting a letter from 28 "prominent industrialists" stating that section 14(a) "does not in any
way relate to speculation or regulation of security exchanges. It gives the Commission a broad
power to regulate stockholders' proxies and so to interfere in the conduct of business corporations."
78 CONG. REc. 8580 (1934). In arguing that the SEC had the authority to adopt its shareholder
proposal rule, one commentator concluded "that Congress was aware that the proxy regulation
section of its exchange bill extended to internal corporate affairs and that, at least to its proponents,
this was necessary and proper." Ryan, supra note 201, at 135. Perhaps so, but Congress intended
that section 14 affect such matters in a way very different than that necessary to validate rule 19c-4.
Moreover, criticisms of the proxy provisions went almost solely to the extensive requirements of
the initial draft. E.g., Pecora Hearings, supra note 168, at 6636 (statement of Richard Whitney); id.
at 6839 (testimony of Frank Shaughnessy); id. at 6913 (testimony of Frank Hope); id. at 6991 (testi-
mony of Eugene Thompson); id. at 7050 (testimony of R.V. Fletcher); id. at 7566 (statement of
Roland Redmond); House Hearings, supra note 162, at 224 (statement of Richard Whitney); id. at
261-62 (testimony of Eugene Thompson); id. at 666 (statement of Merchants' Association of New
York). While section 14 thus received sparse treatment in the debates, Representative Wadsworth,
in one noteworthy observation, stated that the proxy provision had been toned down and, while
regarding it as unnecessary and having nothing to do with the regulation of stock exchanges, he
supposed that it was "not going to impose much hardship or annoyance on anybody." 78 CONG.
REc. 7715 (1934) (Rep. Wadsworth). Given that Wadsworth noted the business community's objec-
tion that the bill would allow federal interference with corporate management and suggested that
those objections had been cured by the new draft, id. at 7713, query whether he would have thought
that the proxy provisions would not result in "annoyance" if he thought they authorized the SEC to
regulate the substance of corporate voting rights?
211. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 677.
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rules relate to the procedures by which the proxies are to be prepared,
solicited, and used.
The proper interpretation of "fair corporate suffrage" now becomes
evident. In using that term, Congress did not mean to address the sub-
stantive question of how many votes per share to which a stockholder is
entitled. Instead, as the D.C. Circuit recognized, Congress was talking
about an entirely different concern: the need for full disclosure and fair
solicitation procedures.212
The historical context in which section 14(a) was adopted supports
this interpretation. When the Exchange Act was first being considered,
state corporate law was largely silent on the issue of corporate communi-
cations with shareholders. It only required that the corporation send
shareholders a notice of a shareholders meeting, stating where and when
the meeting would be held and briefly stating the issues to come before
the meeting.213 By that time, of course, the proxy system of voting was
well-established; so too were complaints about its operation. One com-
mon concern was that corporate managers were soliciting proxies from
shareholders without giving shareholders enough information on which
to make an informed voting decision. Another was that management
used its control of the proxy process to ensure that only those directors
who were acceptable to management were elected. 214 Finally, there were
a variety of widespread procedural abuses. For example, proxy cards
often failed to give shareholders the option of voting against a proposal.
212. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 410-1i. BRT Brief, supra note 122, at 32-37; ABA 1987
Comments, supra note 88, at 15-18. Professor Ryan read the legislative history very broadly in
arguing that section 14(a) authorized the shareholder proposal rule. While one commentator has
questioned his conclusions on this score, Dent, Proxy Regulation in Search of a Purpose: A Reply to
Professor Ryan, 23 GA. L. REv. 815 (1989), Ryan also observed that the SEC's proxy "rules are not
the source of a shareholder's voting rights relative either to management or to other classes of share-
holders. Rather, the federal proxy rules act upon voting patterns already established by the state's
corporations statutes and a company's articles and by-laws." Ryan, supra note 200, at 106. For an
interpretation of section 14(a)'s legislative history supporting the SEC's position, see Seligman, supra
note 15, at 717-19.
213. See M. DOOLEY, supra note 101, at VIII-189 to -190. Present Delaware law does impose
an obligation to use fair procedures in conducting a proxy solicitation. See Schnell v. Chris-Craft
Indus., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971).
214. In 1933, Berle and Means observed that the proxy machinery had "become one of the
principal instruments not by which a stockholder exercises power over the management of the enter-
prise, but by which his power is separated from him." A. BERLE & G. MEANS, supra note 14, at
139. While it is thus true that concerns were raised about management perpetuating itself in office, a
task which the nonvoting stocks of the time could also accomplish, those concerns were phrased in
terms of abuses of the process by which proxies were solicited.
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If the shareholder did not wish to support the proposal, his only option
was to refrain from returning the proxy.
215
Congress was made aware of these concerns in some detail. Thomas
Corcoran, for example, told the House Committee that "[p]roxies, as so-
licitations are made now, are a joke. ' 216 He testified at length about the
lack of disclosure provided to shareholders and abuses of the proxy solic-
itation process. 217 In answer to a question as to how these abuses could
be prevented, he referred solely to the need for better disclosures. 218 Sim-
ilarly, in a brief supporting the Exchange Act's constitutionality, Corco-
ran and Benjamin Cohen stated that the proxy provisions were "designed
to make available to the investor reasonable information regarding the
possibility of control of the corporation .... 2 1 9 Other favorable refer-
ences to section 14 in the hearings are to like effect.2 ° Interestingly,
none of the references to nonvoting stock in the legislative history were
made in connection with section 14.
Read in context, the reference to fair corporate suffrage in the House
Report also relates solely to disclosure and procedural issues. The Com-
mittee, for example, believed that management should not be able to per-
petuate itself in office through "misuse" of corporate proxies.221 It noted
that insiders were using the proxy system to retain control "without ade-
quate disclosure. ' 22 2 It protested that insiders were soliciting proxies
"without fairly informing" shareholders of the purpose of the solicita-
tion.223 The passage concludes by stating that in light of these abuses
section 14(a) gives the "Commission power to control the conditions
under which proxies may be solicited .... ,224 In sum, the passage says
nothing about the substance of the shareholders' voting rights. Instead,
the focus is solely on enabling shareholders to make effective use of
whatever voting rights they possess by virtue of state law.
The Senate Committee's report on stock exchange practices likewise
215. Stevens, supra note 9, at 384 n.1.
216. House Hearings, supra note 163, at 140.
217. See id. at 138-49.
218. Id. at 140.
219. Id. at 937.
220. Eg., Pecora Hearings, supra note 167, at 6543-46 (comments of Thomas Corcoran); id. at
6697 (comments of Frank Altschul); see also id. at 7710-18 (testimony of Samuel Untermyer).
221. H.R. REP. No. 1383, supra note 148, at 13.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 14.
224. Id.
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focused on disclosure concerns. It noted that management frequently
asked shareholders to grant proxies without explanation of the matters to
be acted upon.225 The report emphasized the need for adequate share-
holder knowledge about both the company's financial position and mat-
ters of policy.226 Finally, in describing the intent of section 14(a), the
report contemplated that the SEC's rules thereunder would "protect in-
vestors from promiscuous solicitation of their proxies." 227
Subsequent developments are consistent with this pattern. Senator
O'Mahoney's efforts to federalize corporate law again are particularly
relevant. He held extensive hearings on that topic in 1937 and 1938.228
Mandating a federal one-share/one-vote standard was among the items
under consideration.229 The SEC's Assistant Director of Registration
was asked at one of the hearings whether the federal securities laws pro-
hibited the use of nonvoting stock. He replied that "they only require
that an adequate disclosure of the material facts concerning that struc-
ture be made.' 230 The hearings made no mention of the NYSE policy or
the SEC's powers under either section 14 or section 19. As the Business
Roundtable bluntly stated, after detailing this legislative history, "The
Commission most familiar with the events of 1934... had no illusions
that Congress had somehow sought to preserve the NYSE's 1926 so-
called 'policy' concerning nonvoting stock or that Congress had author-
ized the Commission to do. 231
In addition to the legislative history and prior administrative practices,
the SEC pointed to some loose language in a few cases suggesting a broad
reading of the congressional intent for section 14(a). Of course, prior to
the D.C. Circuit's decision to invalidate rule 19c-4, there were no judicial
225. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 173, at 74. See also S. REP. No. 792, supra note 162, at 12
("Too often proxies are solicited without explanation to the shareholder of the real nature of the
questions for which authority to cast his vote is sought.").
226. S. REP. No. 1455, supra note 173, at 74.
227. Id. at 77.
228. Federal Licensing of Corporations: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 75th
Cong., 1st & 3d Sess. (1937 & 1938) [hereinafter Federal Licensing of Corporations]. See generally
BRT Reply Brief, supra note 143, at 9.
229. S. 3072, 75th Cong,, 3d Sess. § 5(g) (1938). The one-share/one-vote requirement was quali.
fled by allowing corporations to resurrect voting caps restrictions. Id.
230. Federal Licensing of Corporations, supra note 228, at 373.
231. BRT Reply Brief, supra note 143, at 9. In 1942, Professor Reuschlein (a proponent of a
federal corporation law) also recognized that neither state laws on dual class stock nor the NYSE's
policy had been incorporated into "an all-pervasive federal scheme." Reuschlein, supra note 176, at
93.
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interpretations of the Act squarely on point. Moreover, when the cases
upon which the SEC relied are read in context, they too support the
conclusion that section 14(a) was narrowly drawn to deal with disclosure
and procedural abuses. The Commission, for example, placed great em-
phasis on a prior D.C. Circuit decision describing the principal purpose
of section 14 as assuring "corporate shareholders the ability to exercise
their right-some would say their duty-to control the important deci-
sions which affect them in their capacity as stockholders and owners of
the corporation." '232 This comment, however, was made in the context of
the shareholder proposal rule. Notice, moreover, the court's emphasis
on the ability to exercise voting rights, which seems consistent with the
interpretation that section 14 was intended solely to assure that share-
holders could make effective use of whatever voting rights state law
provides.233
More general judicial interpretations of the Exchange Act's scope also
confirm this view. As the D.C. Circuit observed, validating rule 19c-4
would "overturn or at least impinge severely on the tradition of state
regulation of corporate law."'2 34 In a series of cases, the Supreme Court
has made clear that this is not a step to be taken lightly.
In the early 1970s, courts gave SEC rule lOb-5, designed originally as a
catch-all anti-fraud provision, an increasingly expansive reading that in
time might have led to a federal common law of corporations.235 The
Supreme Court applied the brakes in a series of cases, most notably Santa
Fe Industries v. Green.236 Santa Fe attempted to freeze out minority
shareholders of one of its subsidiaries by means of a statutory short-form
232. Medical Comm for Human Rights, 432 F.2d at 680-81.
233. As the Supreme Court once put it: "The purpose of § 14(a) is to prevent management or
others from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclo-
sure in proxy solicitation." J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964). Other judicial interpre-
tations of section 14 are also consistent with the notion that it was directed at assuring full disclosure
and a fair opportunity to exercise corporate voting rights (of course, these decisions were rendered in
cases in which it was those aspects of the rules that were at issue). E.g., Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite
Co., 396 U.S. 375, 381 (1970); Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783, 795 (8th Cir. 1967);
Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 208 (6th Cir. 1961); SEC v. Transamerica Corp.,
163 F.2d 511, 518 (3d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 847 (1948); NUI Corp. v. Kimmelman, 593
F. Supp. 1457, 1469 (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 765 F.2d 399 (3d Cir. 1985); Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F.
Supp. 1129, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Leighton v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 397 F. Supp.
133, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Studebaker Corp. v. Allied Products Corp., 256 F. Supp. 173, 188-89
(W.D. Mich. 1966).
234. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413.
235. Boyer, supra note 149, at 1054.
236. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
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merger. The plaintiffs had state law appraisal rights available, but chose
to seek redress under rule lOb-5. Plaintiffs claimed a rule lOb-5 violation
arose because the minority shareholders did not receive prior notice and
the merger lacked any legitimate business purpose. They also claimed
that their shares had been fraudulently undervalued.237
The Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had not stated a cause of action
under rule lOb-5.238 For present purposes, however, Santa Fe's signifi-
cance derives from its recognition that the fundamental purpose of the
Exchange Act is to assure full disclosure.239 Once complete disclosure is
made, the transaction's fairness and terms do not become issues under
federal law, instead they are a matter for state corporate law.240 The
Court was seemingly concerned that a decision in favor of plaintiffs
would result in federalizing much of state corporate law; in many cases
overriding well-established state policies of corporate regulation.241 This
concern was well-founded, for if the Court gave these plaintiffs a federal
cause of action, it could not meaningfully justify denying a federal claim
in any breach of fiduciary duty case. The Court simply refused to give
rule lob-5 such an expansive reach.242
In the 1980s, the Court once again faced the need to draw lines be-
tween the state and federal roles in regulating public corporations. At
about the same time as Congress adopted the Williams Act to regulate
cash tender offers, the states also began adopting tender offer statutes.
237. Id. at 466-68.
238. Id. at 470-71. The Court rested its holding on several bases. First, section 10(b) and rule
lOb-5 were only intended to reach deception and manipulation. Neither was present on these facts.
Id. at 471-77. Second, the implied private right of action under rule lOb-5 should not be extended to
cases that do not involve deception or manipulation. Id. at 477-80.
239. Id. at 477-78.
240. Id. at 478-80.
241. See id. at 478-79.
242. Id. at 479. It is, of course, still possible to state a federal claim in some breach of duty
cases. However, the correct allegation in such cases derives not from the breach itself, but rather
from the failure to disclose the breach. E.g., Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); see generally Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe.' Rule
10b-5 and the New Federalism, 129 U. PENN. L. REv. 263, 282-94 (1980).
It is conceivable that Congress or the SEC might use disclosure rules to accomplish indirectly
what rule 19c-4 tried to do directly. For example, the Commission could expand existing require-
ments to mandate full disclosure of the probable effects of a dual class transaction and also impose a
fairness disclosure obligation comparable to that applied to going private transactions under SEC
rule 13e-3. I reject this approach at the federal level. It simply elevates form over substance. More-
over, the very concept of federal therapeutic disclosure requirements has been subjected to substan-
tial criticism. See Kripke, supra note 175, at 189-93; Sommer, Therapeutic Disclosure, 4 SEc. REG.
L.J. 263 (1976).
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This first generation of state takeover laws placed significant obstacles in
the bidder's path. The Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE
Corp. ,243 however, rendered these laws invalid. The MITE decision,
nevertheless, suggested one loophole through which state regulation
might pass constitutional muster: the internal affairs doctrine. 2 " The
states picked up on this hint and quickly began adopting a second gener-
ation of takeover laws, this time focusing on matters traditionally viewed
as falling within the sphere of state corporate governance regulation:
shareholder voting rights, shareholder approval of changes in corporate
control, the fairness of post-tender offer mergers, and the like.245
In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. ,24 the Supreme Court for the first
time addressed the validity of one of these statutes. When Dynamics
made a tender offer for CTS, it challenged the Indiana control share ac-
quisition statute on both preemption and commerce clause grounds. The
Seventh Circuit struck down the Indiana Act on both grounds, but a
majority of the Supreme Court reversed. In doing so, the Court made a
number of observations directly relevant to the rule 19c-4 controversy.
The Court recognized that states have a legitimate interest in defining the
attributes of their corporations and protecting shareholders of their cor-
porations.247 It also strongly indicated that the substance of corporate
voting rights is solely a matter of state concern: "No principle of corpo-
ration law and practice is more firmly established than a State's authority
to regulate domestic corporations, including the authority to define the
voting rights of shareholders. 248
These two lines of cases suggest that the Supreme Court views the
states as the principal regulators of corporate governance. 249 Federal law
is seen as placing a gloss on the underlying background of state corporate
law, but not as replacing it.25° Absent a clear expression of congressional
243. 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (striking down an Illinois takeover statute as violating the commerce
clause and, by plurality, the supremacy clause). For an analysis of MITE and its effect on the first
generation statutes, see Bainbridge, supra note 89, at 738-43.
244. See 457 U.S. at 645-46.
245. See S. RE'. No. 265, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1987). The Report accompanied S. 1323,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987), which proposed a wide range of amendments to the federal tender
offer laws. While the bill was reported out of committee, it died without action by the full Congress.
246. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
247. Id. at 90-92.
248. Id. at 89.
249. "[S]tate regulation of corporate governance is regulation of entities whose very existence
and attributes are a product of state law." Id.
250. Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478 (1979).
1991]
Washington University Open Scholarship
616 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
intent, the Court has been reluctant to federalize questions traditionally
within the state sphere.2 51 Given the absence of any indication of con-
gressional intent to preempt state laws governing shareholder voting
rights, it was unlikely that the Supreme Court would uphold rule 19c-
4.252
4. Rule 19c-4 and Fair SRO Competition
The Commission's final gambit deserves brief mention. Section 1 A,
among other things, gives the SEC power to designate those securities
eligible for trading in the national market.253 It was added to the Ex-
change Act in 1975 to facilitate the creation of a national securities mar-
ket and thus help alleviate some of the problems that had caused the
back office crisis.25' Among its purposes were equal regulation of SROs
and fair competition among them. Rule 19c-4 supposedly furthered
these goals by preventing the SROs from competing for listings through
their voting rights listing standards.255
The exchanges, especially the NYSE, have a long tradition of regulat-
ing a wide variety of corporate governance matters through their listing
standards. Issuers presumably take those standards into account when
choosing amongst the various trading markets. Competition for listings
thus occurs with respect to a whole host of corporate governance issues.
Accordingly, the SEC's position would support federalizing corporate
law as to all companies seeking access to the national securities
market.
2 5 6
Nothing in the legislative history supported a reading of the statute
251. Santa Fe Indus., v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975);
Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 413; BRT Brief, supra note 143, at 37.
252. As Professor Coffee observed of Santa Fe, "[i]f this deference to federalism still dominates
the Supreme Court's current thinking about the reach of the federal securities laws, it cannot be
trivialized by the simple expedient of using stock exchange rules to do what cannot be done under
Rule 10b-5. Otherwise, federal chartering of corporations could arrive tomorrow based only on SEC
manipulation of stock exchange rules." Coffee, supra note 53, at 1267. In light of CTS, such defer-
ence plainly still dominates the Supreme Court's thinking.
253. 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1988). For more detailed treatments of section 1 A's relationship
to the one-share/one-vote controversy, compare Seligman, supra note 15, at 715-17 (supporting SEC
position) with Dent, supra note 28, at 730-33 (rejecting SEC position) and Comment, Rule 19c-4:
The SEC Goes Too Far in Adopting a One Share, One Vote Rule, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 1057, 1069-71
(1989) (same).
254. S. REP. No. 75, supra note 153, at 101.
255. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,233.
256. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 416.
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giving the SEC such sweeping powers to equalize listing standards.257
Rather, fair competition within the meaning of section 11A related
mainly to the need to eliminate regulatory restrictions that unfairly im-
peded competition among markets and market makers. 258 Yet, rule 19c-
4 did not eliminate any anti-competitive regulatory restrictions. It did
not promote competition; it merely shielded the NYSE from
competition. 259
The equal regulation goal of section 1 1A likewise does not require uni-
form listing standards. It is intended to assure that no one receives a
competitive advantage through disparate regulation. 21 Prior to rule 19c-
4, disparate standards existed, but the SROs had created them. No gov-
ernment rules created unequal regulation. Thus, this aspect of section
1 A was simply inapplicable. 261' As the D.C. Circuit bluntly stated: "To
argue that Congress's 'equal regulation' mandate supports SEC control
over corporate governance through national listing standards is to gam-
ble that the court will accept a Commission spin on a statutory fragment
without even a glance at its context. Wrong court, bad gamble." 262
C. The Wider Implications of Rule 19c-4"s Demise
The Exchange Act and its legislative history are frustratingly silent on
many key points. Congress certainly intended to delegate broad powers
to the SEC under both sections 14 and 19. After the Act's passage,
"[t]he cops were on Wall Street's corner, and they were well armed. 263
But the legislative history provides virtually no support for the Commis-
sion's attempt to incorporate the NYSE's 1926 policy on nonvoting com-
mon stock into the Exchange Act's provisions on proxies and exchange
listing standards. In contrast, as the D.C. Circuit concluded, the Act
denies the Commission authority over corporate governance generally or
the substance of shareholder voting rights specifically. As such, the D.C.
Circuit's opinion ultimately may have a much broader impact on the
SEC's regulatory authority than was anticipated when the litigation be-
gan. While these interesting questions are generally beyond the scope of
257. Id.
258. S. REP. No. 75, supra note 153, at 12-13.
259. BRT Comments, supra note 88, at 18; BRT Brief, supra note 122, at 39-40.
260. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(36) (1988).
261. BRT Comments, supra note 88, at 18.
262. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 416.
263. J. BROOKS, supra note 163, at 205.
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this Article, three of the opinion's more important implications deserve
to be examined briefly.264
1. SEC Oversight of SRO Rulemaking and Corporate Governance
Had the D.C. Circuit explicitly adopted the interpretation of sections
19(b) and 19(c) advanced by this Article, there would be no question of
whether it removed SRO corporate governance listing standards from
section 19(b)'s grant of oversight authority to the SEC. In theory, at
least, the ambiguities in the Court's analysis discussed above raise some
questions in this area. As a practical matter, however, the Business
Roundtable decision should not significantly affect either SRO or SEC
conduct under section 19(b). Individual SROs still have the power to
adopt voting rights listing standards. They still must submit listing stan-
dards for SEC review. At most, the decision may affect the SROs' ability
to arrive collectively at uniform standards. In any event, as the scope of
the Commission's section 19(b) powers was not at issue, the court's com-
ments are merely dictum.
The decision clearly places boundaries on the Commission's section
19(c) authority to compel affirmatively SRO rulemaking. Although the
D.C. Circuit recognized that the SEC has some regulatory authority over
corporate governance matters, an exercise of that authority must be sup-
ported by a showing that the proposed rule furthers some purpose of the
Act. Moreover, the decision reaffirmed that the SEC may not regulate
corporate governance through section 19(c)'s back door. If the Commis-
sion has no authority to regulate directly some aspect of corporate gov-
ernance, it may not do so indirectly by mandating SRO listing standards.
Although this aspect of the opinion undoubtedly will have its detractors
amongst those who favor expansive SEC powers, it was unquestionably
the right result. While this Article is not intended as an extended treatise
on federalism, one of the thorniest of legal questions, it seems appropriate
to identify briefly the good and sufficient reasons for adherence to the
tradition of state preeminence in the corporate governance area.
Although arguing from legislative inaction is a process fraught with
hazards, the New Deal Congresses' rejection of a federal corporation law
was probably the result of its satisfaction with the balance created by the
securities laws. Federal law was to impose disclosure obligations, along
264. See also Rosenbaum & Swenson, The Demise ofRule 19c-4, 4 INSIGHTS, Sept. 1990, at 3, 5-
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with procedural and anti-fraud rules designed to make the disclosure re-
quirements more effective. In contrast, corporate governance standards
were left to the states.2 65
Allocating primary responsibility over corporate disclosure to the fed-
eral government was essential. That "sunlight is... the best of disinfec-
tants; electric light the most efficient policeman 266 was well accepted by
the 1930s; indeed, it was the basic concept around which the federal se-
curities laws were ultimately drafted. 267 However, the states faced seri-
ous obstacles in attempting to regulate corporate disclosure. Although
the Supreme Court had upheld the constitutionality of state blue sky
laws,268 the commerce clause limited the states' ability to apply those
laws extraterritorially. As a result, most blue sky laws did not regulate
out-of-state transactions. The difficulty of attaining uniformity and coor-
dination among the states exacerbated the problem.2 69 Promoters could
evade restrictive state laws simply by limiting their activities to more per-
missive jurisdictions. Because state securities laws thus could not effec-
tively assure full disclosure, federal intervention was essential to
maintaining the national capital markets.2
The states nevertheless had, and still have, a number of legitimate in-
terests in regulating corporate governance. The corporation is a creature
of the state, "whose very existence and attributes are a product of state
law." 27 1 States have an interest in overseeing the firms they created. 2
They also have an interest in protecting the shareholders of their corpo-
rations.273 Our economic history reflects these facts in its long tradition
of leaving corporate governance regulation to the states.
The New Deal balance thus remains sound. Yet had rule 19c-4 been
265. See S. REP. No. 265, supra note 245, at 46-48; Boyer, supra note 149, at 1053.
266. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1933).
267. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976); SEC v.
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). But see Thel, supra note 161, at
388-94.
268. Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242
US. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917).
269. S. REP. No. 265, supra note 245, at 46.
270. Congress, nevertheless, specifically provided that the federal securities laws should not pre-
empt state blue sky statutes. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r, 78bb (1989). Presumably it did so in order to (1)
respect the rights of the states to regulate transactions taking place within their borders and (2) to
obtain an additional level of protection for investors. See H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10-
11 (1933).
271. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987).
272. Id. at 89.
273. Id. at 91-93.
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upheld, it would have marked the end of that balance. Slippery slope
arguments are often the last refuge of those with no better case, but rule
19c-4 was indeed the proverbial camel's nose.274 No firebreak existed
between substantive federal regulation of dual class stock and a host of
other transactions raising like concerns. Nor did laws affecting share-
holder voting rights differ in principle or theory from any other corpo-
rate governance rules.275 Having once entered the field of corporate
governance regulation, the Commission would have been hard-pressed to
justify stopping with dual class stock. Creeping federalization of corpo-
rate law would have been the most likely result. The D.C. Circuit quite
properly foreclosed this possibility.
2. Effect on Existing and Proposed Proxy Rules
The Business Roundtable decision drew somewhat less clear bounda-
ries in another critical area of SEC regulatory authority. The SEC has
always regarded its powers under section 14(a) as being very broad. The
D.C. Circuit confirmed that the Commission has extensive authority to
adopt rules assuring full disclosure and fair solicitation procedures.
However, it also drew a critical distinction between substantive and pro-
cedural regulation of shareholder voting. As to the former, the SEC has
little, if any, authority.
This holding has important implications for the SEC's scheme of
proxy regulation. As we have seen, the SEC's existing proxy rules affect
corporate governance in a variety of ways. Among these are the restric-
tions on the form of proxies and the use of discretionary voting authority,
the requirement of management cooperation in disseminating an insur-
gent's proxy materials, and the obligation to include shareholder propos-
als in the company's proxy statement.276
The Business Roundtable decision also has important implications for
pending proxy reform proposals. The SEC is currently considering a va-
riety of suggestions from shareholder and institutional investor groups,
such as requiring shareholder approval of takeover defenses and confi-
274. Cf. Business Lawyer Symposium, supra note 109, at 1095 (former-then future-SEC
Chairman David Ruder observed that once the SEC begins regulating matters of corporate govern-
ance "there will be no turning back").
275. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 503 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
276. See supra notes 207-09 and accompanying text.
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dential proxy voting.2 7 7 The latter appears to be attracting particular
support, largely due to allegations of improper management pressure on
institutional investors,278 but both arguably intrude on substantive mat-
ters that fall within the corporate governance sphere.279
The Commission's authority to adopt both its existing rules, especially
the shareholder proposal rule, and the recently proposed reforms has
been questioned.2 0 The Business Roundtable decision provides potent
support for these challenges. It requires courts to determine whether a
challenged rule is substantive or procedural. The court recognized the
existence of a "murky area between substance and procedure,"2 ' which
may resist classification. Nonetheless, the opinion offers a few signposts
by which to resolve future cases. In particular, consider the distinction
the court drew between rule 19c-4 and rule 14a-4(b)(2)'s requirement
that proxies give shareholders an opportunity to withhold authority to
vote for individual director nominees. In the court's view, the latter
"bars a kind of electoral tying arrangement, and thus may be supportable
as a control over management's power to set the voting agenda, or,
slightly more broadly, voting procedures," while "Rule 19c-4 much more
directly interferes with the substance of what shareholders may
enact.
282
Rules addressing unfair solicitation procedures thus should pass mus-
ter. The rules on the form of a proxy card, discretionary authority, and
mailing of insurgent materials, for example, plausibly relate to the Con-
gressional goal of assuring procedural fairness in proxy contests. Each
prevents management from using its control of the proxy solicitation pro-
cess to manipulate the result of shareholder elections. As a means of
preventing management coercion of voters, a confidential voting rule
might pass muster as relating to the same sort of procedural unfairness.
The shareholder proposal rule presents a somewhat less compelling
case. Even though ffl disclosure of all matters to come before a share-
277. Lyons, State's Rights vs. Shareholders' Rights, FORBES, Sept. 17, 1990, at 56.
278. E.g., J. HEARD & H. SHERMAN, supra note 76, at 58-63; P. McGURN, supra note 76.
279. Rosenbaum & Swenson, supra note 264, at 6.
280. For arguments against rule 14a-8 based both on authority and policy grounds, see Dent,
SEC rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1 (1985); Liebler, A Propo-
sal to Rescind the Shareholder Proposal Rule, 18 GA. L. REV. 425 (1984). But see Ryan, supra note
201, at 123-47, 164-83 (arguing that SEC had authority to adopt rule 14a-8 and that the rule is
sound as a matter of policy).
281. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 411.
282. Id.
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holders meeting was its original justification, at first blush the rule does
not seem to advance either purpose of section 14(a). However, absent the
rule, shareholders have no practical means of holding management ac-
countable through the voting process or even affecting the agenda. As
such, it too may be supportable "as a control over management's power
to set the voting agenda."
In contrast, proposals calling for the SEC to require shareholder ap-
proval of takeover defenses clearly fall over the line into substance. State
corporate law currently governs whether shareholder approval of defen-
sive tactics is required; indeed, this is precisely the sort of issue that falls
at the heart of the states' regulatory sphere.28 ' Again, this may be an
area in which SRO regulation is possible, but direct or indirect SEC ac-
tion should be barred.
In sum then, rule 19c-4's invalidation probably does not presage
wholesale restrictions on the SEC's power to regulate proxy solicitations.
The decision merely reaffirms that the SEC must be able to identify pur-
poses of the Act that its rules in fact further. Rule 19c-4 was invalidated
simply because it did not further any of the Act's goals. As long as the
SEC stays on the procedural side of the line, its rules will remain valid.
3. Takeovers Defenses and State Takeover Laws
In the last year or two, a variety of factors have combined to make
hostile tender offers a much less attractive acquisition technique than
they were during most of the 1980s. The junk bond market's woes com-
plicated raising financing for hostile bids. Since the CTS decision, tough
state anti-takeover laws have regularly passed constitutional muster.28 4
In the last year or two, state courts have also appeared more receptive to
target efforts to defend themselves against hostile tender offers.285 In re-
sponse, the proxy contest again became an attractive hostile acquisition
method.286 Indeed, many statutes and defenses effectively force a pro-
spective acquirer to undertake a proxy contest. A bidder seeking control
of a target covered by a control share acquisition statute, for example,
283. See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 503-04 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 67 (1989).
284. Eg. , Amanda Acquisition Corp., 877 F.2d 496; City Capital Associates Ltd. v. Interco, Inc.,
696 F. Supp. 1551 (D. Del.), aff'd, 860 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1988).
285. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989), may signal a
more receptive attitude towards defenses on the part of the Delaware Supreme Court.
286. See The Proxy Battle: Keeping Management on the Hot Seat, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS,
July/Aug., 1990, at 7-8.
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necessarily must solicit proxies in support of its bid. All of which raises
the question of whether the Business Roundtable case will permit corpo-
rate defensive tactics and state takeover statutes to be redirected towards
deterring proxy contests.
A fear that anti-proxy contest statutes and tactics would run afoul of
section 14(a) long constrained defensive efforts directed at proxy con-
tests. Consider Moran v. Household International, Inc. ,287 the Delaware
Supreme Court's first poison pill decision. If any party made a tender
offer for thirty percent or more of Household's shares, the pill would
cause each Household shareholder to be issued one "right" per common
share of stock owned by the shareholder. The rights would be immedi-
ately exercisable and would entitle the holders to purchase 1/100th of a
share of Household preferred stock at a price of $100. The board would
be permitted to redeem the rights at a price of 50 cents per right at any
time prior to their exercise. If any party acquired twenty percent of
Household's stock the rights likewise would be issued on comparable
terms, but would be nonredeemable. In the event of a later merger be-
tween Household and the bidder, Household's shareholders (excepting
the bidder) would be entitled to purchase $200 worth of bidder shares for
$100.288
Plaintiff advanced two relevant arguments in opposition to the pill.
First, he suggested that it would preclude shareholders from exercising
their right to conduct a proxy contest. By effectively prohibiting a proxy
insurgent from purchasing more than twenty percent of the shares before
conducting a proxy contest, the pill supposedly deterred such contests.
The court, however, concluded that the pill would not have a significant
impact on the insurgent's chances for success. Second, both plaintiff and
the SEC, as amicus curiae, suggested that the mere acquisition of the
right to vote twenty percent of the shares through a proxy solicitation
triggered the pill-thereby resulting in it being triggered in every proxy
contest. The court agreed that a literal reading of the pill supported this
interpretation, but neatly avoided the problem by rejecting a literal read-
ing of the pill's terms, holding that a proxy solicitation would not trigger
the pill.289 As interpreted by the court, the pill thus prevented a proxy
insurgent from purchasing more than twenty percent of Household's
shares, but did not interfere with the insurgent's solicitation of proxies.
287. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
288, Id. at 1349.
289. Id. at 1355.
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A more recent example of state efforts to avoid possible conflicts with
section 14(a) is Pennsylvania's new takeover law.290 It requires a con-
trolling person or group to disgorge any profits realized upon disposition
of their target shares if the disposition occurs within eighteen months
after the person or group achieved control status. As originally pro-
posed, the legislation's operative language appeared to apply not only to
tender offerors, but also to anyone soliciting proxies for any purpose
from more than twenty percent of the target's shareholders. 291 As finally
adopted, the statute provides a safe harbor for many proxy solicitations
conducted under the Exchange Act.2 92
In both of these instances, section 14(a)'s potential application to the
issues at hand seemingly troubled decisionmakers. Indeed, SEC Chair-
man Richard C. Breeden told the Pennsylvania legislature that the bill
"could do substantial damage to the shareholders' well-established fed-
eral right to use the proxy machinery to replace the board of direc-
tors. ' 293 The threat of SEC efforts to preempt the Pennsylvania statute
was quite clear.294
As with any federal statute, section 14(a) preempts state laws that
stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress. "295 Under the SEC's broad reading
of section 14(a)'s purposes, any significant state interference with proxy
solicitations would run afoul of a "well-established federal right" and
thereby face preemption. The D.C. Circuit's rule 19c-4 opinion, how-
290. Pa. S.B. 1310, 1989 Sess. (1990) (to be codified in scattered sections of 15 PA. CONS. STAT.),
reprinted in R. ROSENBAUM & S. PARKER, THE PENNSYLVANIA TAKEOVER AcT OF 1990: SuM.
MARY AND ANALYSIS 49-100 (1990). I will discuss the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania and
other state statutes regulating proxy contests in my next Article, Redirecting State Takeover Laws at
Proxy Contests (forthcoming).
291. R. ROSENBAUM & S. PARKER, supra note 290, at 12-13.
292. The statute does not exempt proxy contests by persons seeking control of the target. As
such, the disgorgement remedy will still apply to insurgents seeking to elect a majority of the firm's
directors and to announced bidders conducting a solicitation on any issue. Id. at 13-15.
293. Id. at 21 (emphasis deleted).
294. A constitutional challenge to the Pennsylvania statute is currently pending. Armstrong
World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, Civ. No. 90-2920 (E.D. Pa., filed Apr. 27, 1990).
295. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). Federal law may preempt state law on two
other grounds. First, state law will be preempted when federal regulation is "so pervasive as to make
reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement" federal law. Rice
v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). Second, when "compliance with both federal
and state regulations is a physical impossibility for one engaged in interstate commerce," the
supremacy of federal law requires that the actor comply with the federal rule. Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). Neither seems applicable to the sorts
of issues raised herein.
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ever, opens the possibility of state regulation of proxy contests. By rather
clearly allocating responsibility over the substance of shareholder voting
rights to the states and limiting the SEC's authority to matters of disclo-
sure and procedure, the decision may well alleviate the concerns that
previously constrained state regulation in this area.296
If the Business Roundtable decision in fact encourages greater state
regulation, 29 the dual class stock controversy shall have achieved a most
ironic result. It began because disparate voting rights plans were the
most effective available takeover defense, yet the decision resolving the
controversy may well have opened the door to a new generation of even
more effective weapons in the target's arsenal.
IV. WHAT NExT?
The D.C. Circuit's decision restored the status quo ante. Regulation
of dual class stock is now back in the hands of the states and the SROs.
While the states have done little in response to rule 19c-4's invalidation,
the SROs have been very active indeed. As of this writing, the NYSE
and NASD have adopted listing standards, with SEC approval under
section 19(b), that are essentially identical to rule 19c-4. The NYSE ver-
sion was adopted in December 1989, well before the Business Roundtable
decision.2 98 Shortly after the D.C. Circuit's decision, the NASD pro-
posed a listing standard substantively identical to rule 19c-4. 299 The SEC
solicited comments on the proposal under section 19(b) and, moreover,
gave the NASD temporary approval to implement it for a ninety day
period.3°
296. See R. ROSENBAUM & S. PARKER, supra note 290, at 21 ("If... a court accepts the view
that section 14(a) is intended only to regulate disclosure and certain procedures regarding proxy
voting, it is not clear how [the new Pennsylvania statute] would be relevant to that purpose.");
Rosenbaum & Swenson, supra note 263, at 6.
297. It may not, at least not immediately. After the Business Roundtable decision, albeit with-
out discussing its possible implications, the Delaware Chancery Court reaffirmed that poison pills as
a matter of state law may not interfere with the solicitation of revocable proxies. Stahl v. Apple
Bancorp, Inc., No. 11510, slip op. (Del. Ch. August 9, 1990).
298. Rosenbaum & Swenson, supra note 264, at 3, 5. However, the NYSE reserved the right to
review the status of that standard after the rule 19c-4 litigation concluded. That review presently is
underway. Id.
299. Exchange Act Release No. 28277 (July 27, 1990) 55 Fed. Reg. 31,465 (1990). While the
NASD proposal is substantively identical to rule 19c-4, its coverage would be limited to only those
NASDAQ securities eligible for trading in the National Market System. Id.
300. Exchange Act Release No. 28276 (July 27, 1990), 46 SEC Docket 1201 (1990). AMEX
continues to study the problem and, as yet, has not announced a decision. As this Article went to
press, however, the Exchange's Special Committee on Shareholder Voting Rights issued its report of
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While this Article has argued that it is appropriate for SROs to regu-
late dual class stock and for the SEC to review such proposals under
section 19(b), are SRO rules modelled on rule 19c-4 an appropriate solu-
tion to the dual class stock problem? This Part argues that they are not
and therefore proposes an alternative regime for adoption by the SROs.
We can expect predictions that rule 19c-4's invalidation will produce a
race to the bottom amongst the SROs in which investor protection is
ignored. As management decides on which exchange the firm's securities
will be listed, so the theory goes, the SROs will adopt regulations favored
by management. Instead of using their voting rights rules to protect in-
vestors, the SROs will use them to compete for listings.
The outlook in fact is far less gloomy. In the first place, the doom-
sayers operate on a flawed theory of SRO behavior. Essentially they ad-
vance the old race to the bottom theory in new clothing.30 t And it
remains wrong for the same reasons. In the long run, investors will not
purchase, or at least not pay as much for, securities of firms listed on
markets that cater too excessively to management. Nor will lenders lend
to such firms without compensation for the risks posed by management's
lack of accountability. Those firms' cost of capital will rise, while their
earnings will fall. Among other things, they thereby become more vul-
nerable to a hostile takeover and subsequent managerial purges. Corpo-
rate managers therefore have strong incentives to assure that both their
state of incorporation and SRO offer rules preferred by investors. Com-
petition should thus force excessively pro-management rules to gradually
fall by the wayside.30 2 Indeed, empirical research in the state law context
suggests that efficient solutions to corporate law problems win out over
recommendations. Although the Committee Report does not fully track this Article's recommenda-
tions, its broad outline is consistent with the latter. Like this Article, the Special Committee rejects
the NYSE and NASD approach of simply incorporating the substance of Rule 19c-4 into the Ex-
change's listing standards. Instead, again like this Article, the Committee report proposes a regime
underwhich dual class shares may be listed if they are issued in an initial public offering or, for
existing public corporations, adopted pursuant to specified shareholder voting procedures. SPECIAL
COMMITTEE ON SHAREHOLDER VOTING RIGHTS, REPORT TO THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
AMERICAN STOCK EXCHANGE (Feb. 14, 1991). Unsurprisingly, one SEC Commissioner has already
publicly taken AMEX to task for even considering a departure from Rule 19c-4. 23 Sec. Reg. & L,
Rep. (BNA) 408-10 (Mar. 15, 1991).
301. See Fischel, supra note 27, at 127-32; see also DOJ Comments, supra note 28, at 17-18. But
cf. Coffee, supra note 53, at 1257-58 (SRO race to the bottom precludes exchange regulation of
takeover defenses); Schwartz, supra note 107, at 574 (competition limits SRO ability to regulate
corporate governance).
302. For this and other arguments against the race to the bottom thesis, see Amanda Acquisition
Corp. 877 F.2d at 507-08; R. WINTER, GOVERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION (1978); Fischel, The
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time.3 °3 We can expect SRO competition to produce similar results.
Even if one accepts the race to the bottom hypothesis, however, several
factors exert considerable pressure on the SROs to maintain restrictions
on dual class stock. The SEC retains considerable informal influence
over SRO rulemaking; in Professor Schwartz's apt phrase, the SEC often
regulates "by raised eyebrow. '' 3 1 The Commission is using just that sort
of influence to urge the SROs to adopt listing standards restrictions based
on rule 19c-4.1°5
Other pressures also exist. The NASD has long wanted a state blue
sky law exemption for NASDAQ securities comparable to that available
to NYSE and AMEX listed securities. The pressure state blue sky com-
missions are attempting to exert on the NYSE and AMEX suggests that
restrictive voting rights listing standards will be part of the quid pro quo
for such an exemption. During the SEC's 19c-4 hearings, for example, a
California blue sky commissioner threatened to seek revocation of
NYSE's and AMEX's long-standing exemption from state blue sky laws
if they diluted their voting rights standards."° Shortly before rule 19c-4
was invalidated, for another example, the North American Securities
Administrators Association, the NASD, AMEX, NYSE, and SEC
promulgated a Memorandum of Understanding in which they agreed
that a blue sky exemption would be granted to NASDAQ and exchange
securities only if the SROs adopted voting rights listing standards track-
ing rule 19c-4.207 In the aftermath of the Business Roundtable decision,
for a final example, California required the exchanges and NASD to file
annual reports containing, among other things, data on variances granted
to an issuer from their corporate governance and voting rights listing
standards."' The legislation was widely seen as a response to the free-
dom given SROs by rule 19c-4's invalidation.
The significant question then is not whether the SROs will continue to
"Race to the Bottom " Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law,
76 Nw. U.L. REv. 913 (1982).
303. E.g., Dodd & Leftwich, The Market for Corporate Charters, 53 J. Bus. 259 (1980).
304. Schwartz, supra note 107, at 571.
305. Shortly after the D.C. Circuit's decision, for example, SEC Director of Market Regulation
Richard Ketchum expressed hope that the other SROs would follow the NYSE in adopting rules
tracking rule 19c-4. 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 895-96 (1990).
306. 19 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1076 (1987).
307. Memorandum of Understanding: The Uniform Marketplace Exemption from State Securi-
ties Exemption Requirements (Apr. 28, 1990), NASAA Rep. (CCH) 2351 (1990).
308. 22 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 845 (1990).
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regulate dual class stock; they will do so. The significant question is how
they ought to go about it.
Several alternative regulatory schemes now present themselves. Any
legitimate analytical framework starts with the form of the transaction.
Here the spadework done by the SEC provides valuable guidance. As we
saw in Part II, rule 19c-4 provides a useful starting point in determining
which types of dual class plans require regulation. Rule 19c-4, however,
is not a sound model for SRO rulemaking, as demonstrated by the three
major objections raised to rule 19c-4 in Part II.
First, the rule was based on the flawed rationale of solving collective
action problems. As such, it prohibited some types of dual class transac-
tions that did not raise serious conflicts of interest problems. Among
these were super-voting stock having no transfer restrictions, certain
stock dividends, and lock-ups. Second, while rule 19c-4 provided a rea-
sonable degree of certainty as to when dual class stock plans were per-
missible, some uncertainty remained as to the rule's effect on other types
of corporate transactions. SRO listing standards based on it likewise
threaten to affect a whole host of state laws and corporate transactions
having nothing to do with dual class stock.30 9
Finally, and most important, rule 19c-4's prohibitory approach was
inconsistent with general corporate law principles. Corporate law, and
SRO listing standards for that matter, permits a variety of transactions
posing collective action problems. The coercive nature of exchange offer
recapitalizations, for example, is quite similar to the coercion present in
two-tier tender offers. A host of corporate transactions besides dual class
recapitalizations likewise present shareholder apathy and valuation diffi-
culties. Going private transactions, their leveraged buyout variants, and
310freeze out mergers each raise the same sorts of concerns. More im-
portant, each presents the same sort of management conflicts of interest
present in dual class recapitalizations. In general, however, corporate
law does not prohibit transactions simply because they potentially in-
volve conflicts of interest. Instead, it regulates them in ways designed to
constrain management's self-interested behavior. Unless one makes a liv-
309. It is worth noting that a strict one-share/one-vote rule raises comparable questions. For
example, would the potential for depriving a large shareholder of its voting rights created by state
control share acquisition statutes conflict with a requirement that each share of common stock carry
one vote?
310. R. CLARK, supra note 72, at 504-18; Brudney & Chirlstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.L 1354 (1978).
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ing on the buy-side of corporate takeovers, it is not clear why dual class
recapitalizations should be treated differently.
Although SRO listing standards incorporating the substance of rule
19c-4 are the wrong solution, the ideal regulatory system is probably un-
obtainable. Ideally one would permit dual class recapitalizations, while
using market forces to test their fairness. A market test of a transaction's
fairness is usually preferable to review by courts, independent directors,
or shareholders."' Consider, for example, the analogous problem of
management-led leveraged buyouts. The market for corporate control
provides an effective constraint on management's conflict of interest in
this context. If management offers too low of a price, a competing bidder
may emerge and prevail simply by offering a fair price. This process
gives management an incentive to avoid low-ball offers. By definition,
however, no comparable market check exists in a dual class recapitaliza-
tion. As such, one must seek alternative mechanisms of dissipating the
conflict of interest.
Imposing a requirement that the disparate voting rights plan fully
compensate shareholders for the loss of their voting rights provides one
possible solution. Dual class stock would be unobjectionable if manage-
ment provided such compensation. However, the difficulty of measuring
the voting rights' value makes this solution impractical. One simply
could not confidently believe that the plan fully compensated the
minority.
In light of the difficulties posed by the foregoing solutions, this Article
proposes an SRO listing standard based on two principal models. First,
it draws extensively on the original dual class stock listing standard pro-
posed by the NYSE in 1986.312 Second, it also draws on state law solu-
tions developed for comparable transactions posing conflict of interest
concerns similar to dual class recapitalizations. In particular, the propo-
sal focuses on solutions developed in the context of two-tier tender offers,
freezeout mergers, and interested director transactions.
The proposal looks first to the type of transaction in question. Any
rule should be limited to true dual class stock transactions, thereby elimi-
nating any possible side effects on other corporate actions. Second, for
the reasons discussed in Part II, no safeguards over and above those pro-
vided by state law are necessary with respect to dual class stock issued in
311. See Bainbridge, supra note 96, at 273-81.
312. See Exchange Act Release No. 23803 (Nov. 13, 1986), 51 Fed. Reg. 41,715 (1986).
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an IPO, a subsequent offering or dividend of lesser-voting stock, or an
acquisition. Nor are any additional safeguards necessary with respect to
super-voting rights shares issued without transfer restrictions or in a
lock-up. SRO listing standards should therefore permit issuers to adopt
those plans freely.
It is true that blatant forms of coercion, such as pressure on institu-
tional shareholders, may occur in these sorts of transactions. However,
blatant coercion need not be addressed directly, as it is undoubtedly ille-
gal under existing state law. In Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc. ,313
for example, a firm's chief executive officer and largest shareholder
threatened to block acquisitions of the firm unless the shareholders ap-
proved a dual class recapitalization giving him voting control. The Dela-
ware Chancery Court held that he thereby violated his fiduciary duty as
an officer and director of the firm.314 The logic of this holding suggests
that managerial pressure on institutional and other shareholders will
likewise violate these duties.
In contrast, transactions involving more subtle conflicts require some
additional safeguards. Among these are exchange offers and recapitaliza-
tions creating super-voting rights stock bearing transfer restrictions. In
order to dissipate the conflicts of interest they raise, the proposal permits
them only if the corporation's independent directors and disinterested
shareholders approve them. Requiring approval by a committee of in-
dependent board members created to negotiate with management and/or
the controlling shareholder is common in conflict of interest transactions.
In the freeze out merger context, the Delaware Supreme Court has made
clear that this procedure is "strong evidence that the transaction meets
the test of fairness. ' 315 Statutes governing interested director transac-
tions and two-tier tender offers effectively presume that the transaction is
fair if approved by the independent directors.3"6 Of course, some risk
that purportedly independent directors will be biased in favor of their
compatriots always exists; but courts give greatest deference to independ-
ent directors in contexts like this one in which a market test of the trans-
313. 517 A.2d 271 (Del. Ch. 1986).
314. Id. at 276-79.
315. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709-10 n.7 (Del. 1983).
316. E.g., Md. Corps. & Ass'ns Code Ann. §§ 3-202, 3-601 to -603 (Michie Supp. 1990) (re-
quirement that bidder pay statutorily defined fair price in back end merger will be waived if transac-
tion approved by continuing, disinterested directors); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984)
(disinterested director approval of interested director transaction shifts burden of proof to plaintiff to
show transaction amounts to waste).
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action proves impractical.3t7 Guided by outside counsel and financial
advisers and facing the risk of personal liability for uninformed or biased
decisions,3"8 disinterested directors should act as an effective check on
unfairness in a dual class recapitalization.
Majority approval of the disinterested shares likewise is a common fea-
ture of the models on which this proposal is based.31 9 Approval of a
freezeout merger or interested director transaction by a majority of the
disinterested shareholders, for example, shifts the burden of proof with
respect to fairness back to the complaining shareholder.320 Under so-
called fair price statutes, the obligation to pay a statutorily defined fair
price in the second-step of a two-tier offer will be waived if the disinter-
ested shareholders approve the transaction.321 These rules give the
shareholders a collective opportunity to reject unfair proposals, thereby
helping to eliminate the pressure on individual shareholders to accept
the offer. 22 The shareholder approval requirement proposed herein
should likewise help remove the coercive aspects of dual class
recapitalizations.323
In addition, of course, the vote must be an informed one.324 In partic-
ular, the board should disclose the anticipated effects of the transaction.
The transaction's impact on the allocation of voting power within the
317. Bainbridge, supra note 96, at 276-79.
318. Although many states have limited or eliminated personal monetary liability for directors
who violate their duty of care, most (including Delaware) have retained personal liability for
breaches of the duty of loyalty. See Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919,
920-22 (1988).
319. For this purpose, interested shareholders should include controlling shareholders, if any, all
directors and officers of the firm, and any persons affiliated with them through family or other rela-
tionships. Cf. Dent, supra note 28, at 752-55 (also calling for approval by "disinterested"
shareholders).
320. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703 (freezeouts); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984) (in-
terested director transactions).
321. E.g., MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-603(b) (Michie Supp. 1990).
322. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
323. In Weiss v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 777 (Del. Ch. 1989), aff'd without
op., 574 A.2d 264 (Del. 1990), plaintiff claimed that a disparate voting rights plan violated manage-
ment's fiduciary duties. The Delaware Chancery Court held that informed shareholder approval of
the plan constituted an effective ratification of the plan and thereby precluded judicial review of the
fiduciary duty claim.
324. Compare Lacos Land Co. v. Arden Group, Inc., 517 A.2d 271, 279-81 (Del. Ch. 1986)
(preliminary injunction granted when proxy statement failed to disclose fully the consequences of
dual class plan) with Weiss v. Rockwell International Corp., 15 Del. J. Corp. L. 777 (Del. Ch. 1989),
aff'd without op., 574 A.2d 264 (Del. 1990) (preliminary injunction denied where proxy statement
made full disclosure of effect of dual class plan on voting control of firm).
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firm and on a potential hostile bidder for the firm are the key concerns.325
In addition, if the transaction includes dividend or other sweeteners, the
board ought to disclose the basis on which they were chosen.
Admittedly, this proposal does not cure the problem of rational share-
holder apathy. However, excluding management's shares from the count
does eliminate the possibility of a proposal being approved over the ob-
jections of a majority of outside shareholders. Dissenting shareholders
thus have a fighting chance to defeat the proposal.
The disclosure aspects of the proposal also help counterbalance the
shareholder apathy problem. By requiring management to set forth the
anticipated effects of the plans, the proposal should deter some of the
more egregious types of plans. Management may be less likely to put
forth plans causing a dramatic, yet uncompensated shift in the firm's vot-
ing. control when they must justify doing so in print.
Finally, it is perhaps easy to overstate the importance of shareholder
apathy. 326 The growing prevalence of sophisticated institutional inves-
tors in the shareholder community will help prevent shareholder coer-
cion.32 7 Institutions now control over forty-three percent of all NYSE-
listed securities, and it is estimated that by the year 2000 pension funds
alone will control fifty percent of all corporate stocks. 328 Institutions
also are becoming more active, "taking their voting rights more seriously
and using the proxy process to defend and promote their interests. '329
Increasingly, they vote against takeover defenses proposed by manage-
ment and in favor of shareholder proposals recommending removal of
existing defenses. Most important for present purposes, only four per-
325. This obligation is similar to one already imposed by federal law. Item 202(a)(5) of Regula-
tion S-K requires disclosure of any anti-takeover charter or by-law provisions.
326. In this regard, consider the following summary of the SEC's argument in favor of rule 19c-
4: (1) voting rights are important; (2) therefore we are going to prohibit certain types of dual class
transactions; but (3) because shareholders are so apathetic about their voting rights that they rou-
tinely approve dual class stock plans, we aren't going to create an exception for shareholder ap-
proved transactions. In this admittedly sarcastic light, the case that rule 19c-4 was really directed at
the use of dual class stock as a takeover defense becomes quite convincing.
For an excellent critique of the shareholder apathy theory, see Black, Shareholder Passivity Reex-
amined, 89 MICH. L. Rav. 570 (1990).
327. See BRT Comments, supra note 88, at 32-35; DOJ Comments, supra note 28, at 11-13, 16-
17.
328. Corporate Takeovers: Public Policy Implications for the Economy and Corporate Governance
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance of the House
Comm on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 112 (Comm. Print 99-QQ 1986).
329. P. BERGIN, VOTING BY INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ISSUES
IN THE 1988 PROXY SEASON 1 (1988).
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cent of the institutions responding to one industry survey favored dual
class plans, while nearly two-thirds voted against them as a matter of
policy.3 3 ° These data suggest that a requirement of disinterested share-
holder approval in fact will have real teeth.331
In sum, this approach offers a number of advantages. In the absence
of compelling evidence that dual class stock always harms shareholders,
they should be free to approve disparate voting rights plans provided that
the decision is in fact a truly free one. By presumptively permitting dual
class IPOs and other non-coercive transactions, the proposal allows those
disparate voting rights plans that, if not clearly beneficial to the share-
holders, are at least unobjectionable. As to transactions that are poten-
tially objectionable, the proposal eliminates the principal ground for
objection by assuring meaningful shareholder review.
V. CONCLUSION
For over 200 years proponents of corporate reform have sought to cre-
ate a federal law of corporations. Each frontal assault on the citadel of
state primacy failed. In section 19(c), however, the Commission found a
back door through which corporate law might have been federalized.
The implications for our dual system of state and federal regulation were
substantial.
If the D.C. Circuit had upheld rule 19c-4, the Commission soon would
have faced claims that other matters of corporate governance should be
subjected to federal regulation. Takeover defensive tactics, for example,
were a prime candidate. The Williams Act was intended to protect
shareholders from both management and bidders.332 As some takeover
defenses are said to coerce shareholders into rejecting a hostile offer, the
Commission could have readily argued that exchange listing standards
precluding such defenses furthered the Williams Act's purpose and were
thus appropriate under section 19(C). 333
330. Id. at 25.
331. The institutional investor community was virtually unanimous in supporting rule 19c-4.
The SEC chose to interpret this support as indicating that institutional investors can be disen-
franchised by dual class recapitalizations. Adopting Release, supra note 5, at 89,216 n.75. A cynic
might interpret it as meaning that institutional investors were simply trying to get rid of a strong
takeover defense in order to continue bolstering their quarterly performance statistics by reaping
short-term profits from corporate acquisitions.
332. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 69, 82-83 (1987).
333. BRT Brief, supra note 122, at 45-46. The objection that the SEC as a practical matter
would not seek broad federal regulation of corporate governance may or may not be true of the
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The D.C. Circuit's decision rather clearly holds that the Commission
may not use its section 19(c) powers to federalize corporate governance
regulation generally. 334  Instead, before the Commission can mandate
SRO corporate governance listing standards it will have to show that
Congress clearly intended to displace the relevant state law.335 If the
back door has not been locked, it at least is no longer wide open. Corpo-
rate governance standards are thus back where they belong-in the
hands of the states and SROs.
present commissioners. Former Commissioner Grundfest, at least, claimed that "It]he reasoning
supporting rule 19c-4 would ... not necessarily support future Commission rulemakings imposing
uniform listing standards regulating other aspects of corporate governance." Adopting Release,
supra note 5, at 89,234 (Grundfest, C., concurring). It is true, however, that the Commission on a
number of occasions has tried to implement sweeping reforms in this area. For a vigorous critique of
one such effort, see Kripke, supra note 176, at 187-205. Nothing guaranteed that the Commission
would exercise restraint in its future interpretations of section 19(c).
334. Business Roundtable, 905 F.2d at 412-13.
335. Id. at 96,343.
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